GR 203372 So; (June, 2015) (Digest)
G.R. No. 203372, 206290, 209138 & 212030, June 16, 2015.
Case Parties: Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, Irma A. Villanueva and Francisca B. Rosquita, and Eddie U. Tamondong, Petitioners, vs. Office of the President, et al., Respondents.
FACTS
The consolidated cases involve petitioners whose presidential appointments were revoked by President Benigno S. Aquino III through Executive Order No. 2, which recalled appointments deemed as “midnight appointments” issued in violation of the constitutional ban under Section 15, Article VII. The petitioners received their appointment letters from former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 (the start of the constitutional ban), but they took their oaths of office or assumed their positions on or after March 11, 2010. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil’s appointment was dated March 5, 2010, and she took her oath on March 22, 2010. Atty. Venturanza’s appointment was dated February 23, 2010, and he took his oath on March 15, 2010. Villanueva and Rosquita had appointments dated March 3 and 5, 2010, respectively, and took their oaths on April 13 and March 18, 2010. Eddie Tamondong’s appointment was dated March 1, 2010, and he took his oath on March 25, 2010. In several instances, the appointment papers were not officially released through the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) until May 2010. E.O. No. 2, Section 1(a), defined midnight appointments to include those bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010, where the appointee accepted, took an oath, or assumed office on or after March 11, 2010.
ISSUE
The primary legal issue is the validity of Section 1(a) of Executive Order No. 2, particularly the phrase “including all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010,” in relation to the constitutional ban on midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING
The ponencia (majority opinion) upheld the constitutionality of E.O. No. 2, Section 1(a), and denied the petitions. It interpreted the term “appointments” in Section 15, Article VII as encompassing the entire process—from the President’s act of signing the appointment to the appointee’s acceptance through oath or assumption of office. Consequently, for an appointment to be valid and not covered by the ban, the entire process must be completed before the ban takes effect. Since the petitioners took their oaths or assumed office after March 11, 2010, their appointments were considered made during the ban period and were validly revoked.
Justice Brion, in a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, concurred in the result (denial of the petitions) but dissented from the ponencia’s reasoning. He argued that the constitutional prohibition under Section 15, Article VII pertains solely to the President’s discretionary act of making an appointment (signing and issuing the appointment paper), not to the subsequent acts of the appointee (acceptance, oath, assumption). He maintained that the phrase in E.O. No. 2, Section 1(a), which includes appointments based on the appointee’s actions after the ban, unconstitutionally expands the scope of the prohibition. For Justice Brion, an appointment is valid if the appointment papers are signed and issued prior to the ban, and the appointee’s acceptance may occur thereafter without violating the Constitution.