GR 203371 CAguioa (Digest)
G.R. No. 203371, June 30, 2020
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CHARLIE MINTAS FELIX, A.K.A. SHIRLEY MINTAS FELIX, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
The respondent, Charlie Mintas Felix, had his birth certificate registered twice. The first birth certificate, filed with the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Itogon, Benguet, contained erroneous entries: his first name was “Shirley” instead of “Charlie,” his father’s surname was “Filex” instead of “Felix,” and his gender was “female” instead of “male.” A second birth certificate with correct entries was filed with the LCR of Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija. In 2007, respondent filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, seeking to correct the erroneous entries in his first birth certificate and to cancel his second birth certificate. The RTC granted the petition, ordering the corrections and the cancellation of the second certificate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the second birth certificate filed in Nueva Ecija. Notably, Republic Act No. 9048 was already in effect when the petition was filed.
ISSUE
The primary issue, as addressed in the Separate Opinion, is whether the corrections sought by the respondent (first name and father’s surname) are clerical in nature and thus fall under the administrative procedure of R.A. 9048, and whether the respondent’s direct resort to a judicial procedure under Rule 108 was proper.
RULING
Justice Caguioa, in his Separate Opinion, concurred in the result but provided a different analysis. He held that the corrections of the respondent’s first name and his father’s surname are clerical in nature and therefore fall under the coverage of R.A. 9048, which provides an administrative procedure for such corrections. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a person must first avail of this administrative remedy before resorting to judicial action under Rule 103 or Rule 108, unless the administrative petition is denied. However, Justice Caguioa concluded that the respondent’s direct filing of a judicial petition was justified under the circumstances. He reasoned that requiring the respondent to pursue separate administrative proceedings for the clerical errors and a judicial proceeding for the correction of sex (a substantial change) would constitute splitting a single cause of action. The respondent sought a unified remedy to address all errors across two related documents (the erroneous first certificate and the duplicate second certificate). Therefore, the judicial recourse was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits and to resolve all related issues efficiently.
