GR 201310; (January, 2016) (Digest)
G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016
Mark Reynald Marasigan y Deguzman, Petitioner, vs. Reginald Fuentes alias “Regie,” Robert Calilan alias “Bobby,” and Alain Delon Lindo, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Mark Reynald Marasigan alleged that on December 20, 2006, respondents Reginald Fuentes, Robert Calilan, and Alain Delon Lindo, together with other unidentified individuals, assaulted him. The attack began with Fuentes throwing an object at him, followed by the group punching and kicking him. Fuentes then attempted to hit Marasigan’s head with a piece of hollow block, which Marasigan parried, fracturing his finger. Lindo and Calilan held Marasigan’s arms while Fuentes prepared to strike again with the block. The assault ceased only upon the arrival of neighbors. Marasigan filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder.
After preliminary investigation, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause only for less serious physical injuries against Fuentes and Calilan, absolving Lindo. On review, DOJ Undersecretary Linda Malenab-Hornilla found probable cause for attempted murder against all three respondents, noting their collective actions indicated a design to kill, thwarted only by the neighbors’ intervention. However, DOJ Secretary Agnes Devanadera, on a motion for reconsideration, reversed this, dismissing the complaints against Fuentes and Lindo and sustaining only a charge of less serious physical injuries against Calilan. The Court of Appeals affirmed Secretary Devanadera’s resolution.
ISSUE
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to charge respondents with attempted murder.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reinstating the Undersecretary’s resolution directing the filing of informations for attempted murder. The Court held that Secretary Devanadera committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding factual circumstances indicative of a collective intent to kill. Probable cause does not require clear and convincing evidence of guilt, only a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty. The Secretary erred in requiring “clear and convincing evidence” of intent, which is a standard for conviction, not for finding probable cause.
The factual allegations—the use of a hollow block aimed at the head, the holding of the victim’s arms to render him defenseless, the concerted attack by multiple persons, and the cessation only upon outside intervention—sufficiently supported a reasonable belief that respondents acted in concert with intent to kill, which was not achieved due to timely interruption. Thus, these facts constitute probable cause for attempted murder. The case was remanded for the filing of the appropriate informations.