G.R. No. 20088; March 5, 1923
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MASANTOL, PAMPANGA, petitioner, vs. Honorable GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and BENITO BAUTISTA, TEODORO GALANG, EMIGDIO BAUTISTA, SIXTO BUSTOS, VICTOR SUNGA, and FLORENTINO USI, respondents. (Consolidated with cases involving respondents MANUEL BUSTOS and LUPO CANILAO)

FACTS

After a municipal election in Masantol, Pampanga, the municipal council, acting as the board of canvassers, canvassed the returns and proclaimed the results. Certain losing candidates filed an election contest, which was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court for insufficiency. After the statutory period for filing election contests had expired, these same individuals filed petitions for writs of mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against the municipal council. They sought to compel the council to reconvene and recanvass the votes to correct alleged mathematical errors, aiming to have themselves declared elected. The municipal council demurred, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction. The trial judge, respondent Guevara, overruled the demurrer. The council then applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari (G.R. No. 19803), which was denied for failure to exhaust remedies in the lower court. The council subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, specifically raising the jurisdictional issue, which was again overruled. The council then filed the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 20088).

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to entertain the mandamus proceedings, which sought to compel the municipal board of canvassers to recanvass election returns after the statutory period for election contests had expired.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, ruling that the lower court acted without jurisdiction. The mandamus proceedings were, in substance, an election contest filed in another form after the statutory period for such contests had lapsed. The purpose of the Election Law in fixing a peremptory period for election protests is to ensure finality, and courts cannot extend this period or create remedies outside the statutory framework. The trial court’s duty was to apply the law as written, not to provide a remedy based on a perception that the statutory period was “too short.” Since the action was essentially a belated election contest, the lower court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus. The Court also clarified that a motion for reconsideration in the lower court is not an absolute prerequisite for certiorari if the jurisdictional question was already squarely raised, argued, and decided therein.