G.R. No. 199537 , February 10, 2016
Republic of the Philippines vs. Andrea Tan

FACTS

Respondent Andrea Tan applied for original registration of title over a parcel of land in Consolacion, Cebu, which she purchased in 1992. She claimed ownership through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by herself and her predecessors-in-interest for over thirty years. The land was certified as alienable and disposable only on September 1, 1965. The Municipal Trial Court granted her application, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, citing Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, ruled that the property, having been declared alienable before the application, could be acquired by prescription, and that Tan had met the 30-year prescriptive period.
The Republic appealed, arguing that for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, the applicant must prove possession since June 12, 1945, and the land must have been alienable since that date. It contended that the CA erred in applying the rules on acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code to land of the public domain.

ISSUE

Whether alienable and disposable land of the public domain is automatically converted into patrimonial property of the State, susceptible to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code, merely by virtue of its classification as such.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA. The Court clarified the distinction between the two modes of acquiring ownership of alienable public lands. The first is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. This requires possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The second is through ordinary acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code, which applies only to patrimonial property of the State.
The Court held that not all alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are patrimonial. The classification of land as alienable and disposable merely authorizes its disposition under the Public Land Act. For such land to become patrimonial, there must be an express declaration by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth, or an act of alienation, such as a sale, has occurred. Mere classification as alienable does not equate to a declaration of patrimonial property. Since there was no such express declaration or act of alienation for the subject lot, it remained property of the public domain. Therefore, acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code could not run against it. Tan’s claim, based on possession falling short of the June 12, 1945 requirement, must fail.