G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021
ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

This is a Separate Concurring Opinion by Justice Hernando in the case of Tan-Andal v. Andal. The main petition sought the declaration of nullity of marriage based on the respondent’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Justice Hernando concurs in the result of granting the petition due to the respondent’s psychological incapacity. However, he expresses a belief in the continued soundness of the guidelines established in the Molina case, as clarified in Ngo Te v. Te.

ISSUE

The central issue addressed in this opinion is the proper jurisprudential approach to interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code concerning psychological incapacity. Specifically, Justice Hernando disagrees with the ponencia’s (Justice Leonen’s) orientation towards liberalizing the interpretation of Article 36 and moving away from the Molina guidelines.

RULING

Justice Hernando respectfully concurs only in the result of granting the petition. His ruling consists of the following key points:
1. Philosophical and Legal Foundation of Marriage: Marriage is a coherent, stable, and lifelong union chosen by the parties. The State has a stake in protecting this institution, as reflected in constitutional policy recognizing the sanctity of family life. The law on marriage must rest on and reflect the moral convictions of society about the permanence of the marital union.
2. Provenance of Article 36: The origin of Article 36 from Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law is part of its legislative history and is a valid source for interpretation. This borrowing does not violate the separation of Church and State, as laws often reflect the moral and cultural beliefs of society. The provision is based on the empirical recognition that a person, as a psycho-somatic being, can have psychological blocks to fulfilling marital obligations, similar to physical impediments.
3. Validity of the Molina Guidelines: The guidelines in Republic v. Molina should not be set aside. They distill the Court’s thought on psychological incapacity and provide necessary guidance to lower courts to prevent discordant and irreconcilable applications of Article 36. While they are guidelines and not a rigid taxonomic checklist, lower courts must explain any deviation from them.
4. Proposed Restatement of Doctrine: Justice Hernando proposes a restatement of the Molina doctrine with four elements:
a. The burden of proof lies with the petitioner.
b. Psychological incapacity must be a conclusion based on a clinically or satisfactorily evidenced psychological disorder, preponderantly established by a court-appointed expert or indubitably established by competent evidence.
c. There must be no evidence questioning the presumption that the condition existed at the time of the marriage (juridically antecedent).
d. The disorder must prevent the afflicted party from discharging the essential obligations of marriage, and the petition must clearly allege these unfulfilled obligations.
5. Judicial Restraint: The Court is cognizant of the limits of judicial power. While there may be concerns about providing remedies for irreparably broken marriages, the Court must operate within the confines of the law as enacted, respecting the distribution of powers among the branches of government.