ORLANDO A. RAYOS, FE A. RAYOS-DELA PAZ, represented by DR. ANTONIO A. RAYOS, and ENGR. MANUEL A. RAYOS, Petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondent.
FACTS
This case originated from a complaint for eminent domain filed by the City of Manila against several defendants, including the petitioners, to acquire a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 227512. The City based its action on Ordinance No. 7949, which authorized the acquisition. The defendants, while willing to sell, contested the offered price of ₱1,000 per square meter, claiming the fair market value was ₱50,000 per square meter. During the proceedings, petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos (as a substitute for a deceased defendant) filed a Motion to Dismiss. They argued that (1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional, and (2) the doctrines established in Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila applied squarely to the case. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49, denied the motion to dismiss in its Order dated March 11, 2010, and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order dated January 6, 2011. The RTC ruled that the petitioners failed to demonstrate how the facts of the cited cases were similar to the present case to warrant the application of stare decisis. Petitioners then filed the present petition directly with the Supreme Court, assailing the RTC’s orders.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition assailing the RTC’s interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.
The Court held that the petition was procedurally infirm. First, the order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order, which is not appealable under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The proper remedy to challenge such an order is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Since the petitioners availed of the wrong remedy, the petition deserved outright dismissal.
Second, even if the Court treated the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 (the proper remedy), it must still be dismissed for violating the principle of hierarchy of courts. While the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The petitioners failed to show any such exceptional or compelling reasons. Their petition merely rehashed the arguments from their motion to dismiss, consisting of unsubstantiated allegations and failing to clearly demonstrate the applicability of the cited cases or to specifically explain the constitutional infirmity of Ordinance No. 7949.
Third, to the extent the petition could be construed as one for declaratory relief (as suggested by its caption), the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over such actions. While the Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition or mandamus (over which it has original jurisdiction), this is done only for cases with far-reaching implications and transcendental issues. The present case exhibited no such characteristics.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
