G.R. No. 196036; October 23, 2013
ELIZABETH M. GAGUI, Petitioner, vs. SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO, Respondents.

FACTS

Respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed complaints for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against PRO Agency Manila, Inc. and its foreign principal. In a 1997 Decision, Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos held the agency and the foreign principal jointly and severally liable. The decision became final and executory. After writs of execution were returned unsatisfied, respondents filed a Motion to Implead the agency’s corporate officers, including petitioner Elizabeth Gagui as Vice-President. The Executive Labor Arbiter granted the motion in 2003, holding Gagui solidarily liable, leading to the garnishment of her bank account and levy of her properties.
Petitioner moved to quash the writs, arguing she was never a party to the original case and the 1997 Decision did not name her. She contended that holding her liable through a post-judgment motion improperly modified a final judgment. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals denied her motions, citing Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act (RA 8042), which imposes solidary liability on corporate officers of recruitment agencies for money claims.

ISSUE

Whether the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner solidarily liable for the judgment award through a post-judgment motion to implead, despite not being a party in the original decision which had become final and executory.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, reversing the CA. The Court held that while RA 8042 imposes solidary liability on corporate officers, this liability must be established in a proper proceeding where the officer is afforded due process. The 1997 Decision, which was final and executory, named only the agency and the foreign principal. To hold Gagui liable, she must first be impleaded as a party during the litigation or in a separate action where her liability can be adjudicated.
The post-judgment order impleading her and holding her solidarily liable effectively altered the final judgment, which is prohibited. Execution must conform to the judgment decreed; it cannot expand liability to persons not originally adjudged liable. The labor tribunals and the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the order, as it violated the rule on immutability of final judgments and petitioner’s right to due process. The Court emphasized that the liberal interpretation of labor laws cannot override the fundamental right to due process.