G.R. No. 194169; December 4, 2013
ROMEO R. ARAULLO, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, HON. GERARDO C. NOGRALES, HON. ROMEO L. GO, HON. PERLITA B. VELASCO, and ARDEN S. ANNI, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Romeo R. Araullo secured a final and executory Court of Appeals judgment declaring his dismissal from Club Filipino, Inc. illegal. The case was remanded to the NLRC for computation of monetary awards. After the original Labor Arbiter inhibited himself, the case was raffled to respondent Labor Arbiter Arden S. Anni. Arbiter Anni initially issued a Writ of Execution but subsequently quashed it upon Club Filipino’s motion, citing the NLRC rule that a writ shall not be issued until a computation is approved by the Labor Arbiter after notice and hearing. He then voluntarily inhibited himself from the case due to fraternal ties with Club Filipino’s president and counsel. Petitioner filed a petition with the NLRC to set aside the quashal order. The NLRC First Division, composed of respondents Commissioners Nograles, Go, and Velasco, denied the petition, finding the quashal proper as the writ was issued without the required prior approval of the computation. Petitioner then filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, alleging manifest partiality and gross negligence in quashing the writ and denying his petition. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause against the public respondents.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court explained that for a charge of manifest partiality or gross negligence under R.A. 3019 to prosper, there must be a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or a conscious and deliberate intent to do an unjust act. The records showed that Arbiter Anni quashed the writ because it was issued without complying with the mandatory procedure under the NLRC Rules, specifically the requirement for a prior order approving the computation after notice and hearing. His subsequent voluntary inhibition, while indicative of prudence, did not retroactively render his prior order corrupt or unjust. The NLRC Commissioners, in affirming the quashal, were merely performing their official duty based on applicable rules. Their discretionary act, performed within legal bounds and absent any proof of corrupt motive, cannot be the basis for a criminal charge. The Ombudsman’s finding of no probable cause was based on substantial evidence and is generally beyond the Court’s review unless shown to be arbitrary. Here, the respondents’ actions were anchored on a legal provision and the exercise of official discretion, not on manifest partiality or gross negligence.