G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012
MA. MERCEDES L. BARBA, PETITIONER, VS. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Petitioner Ma. Mercedes L. Barba was a Dean of the College of Physical Therapy at respondent Liceo de Cagayan University. Her appointment letter stated her position was “one of trust and confidence” for a three-year term. Due to a severe decline in enrollment, the university decided to indefinitely freeze the college’s operations. Respondent informed petitioner that her services as dean would end and subsequently directed her to report as a full-time faculty member in the College of Nursing for the next school year, asserting she was still bound by a scholarship contract to serve the university.
Petitioner refused the teaching assignment, viewing it as a demotion and constructive dismissal. She requested separation benefits due to the college’s closure. Respondent, however, insisted she report for duty and ultimately terminated her services on the ground of abandonment. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had jurisdiction over petitioner’s illegal dismissal case, or if her position as Dean was a corporate office, placing the dispute under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), now the regular courts.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC had jurisdiction. The Court held that petitioner was not a corporate officer, and thus her dismissal was a labor dispute cognizable by labor tribunals. A corporate officer is one who is appointed or elected in accordance with the corporation’s by-laws or by the board of directors, where such position is specifically enumerated or contemplated. The mere description of a position as one of “trust and confidence” does not automatically make it a corporate office.
Examining the university’s by-laws, the Court found that while the Board of Directors approved the appointment of academic deans, the position of Dean of the College of Physical Therapy was not among the corporate officers expressly listed in the by-laws. The by-laws enumerated corporate officers such as the President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Secretary, but not academic deans. Therefore, petitioner’s appointment, though requiring board approval, was a managerial employee appointed to a managerial function, not a corporate office created by the by-laws or through board action. Consequently, her dismissal involved an employer-employee relationship governed by labor laws. The case was remanded to the NLRC for proper proceedings on the merits of the illegal dismissal complaint.