G.R. No. 19328 & G.R. No. 19329, December 22, 1989
Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes K. Katigbak, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. The Solicitor General, et al., defendants-appellees. / Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes K. Katigbak, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

These consolidated cases originated from two actions. In the first, the Katigbak spouses sought to enjoin the Solicitor General from filing a forfeiture complaint under Republic Act No. 1379 and to declare the law unconstitutional, particularly its application to properties acquired before its enactment. They also sought damages against investigating officers. The second action was the actual forfeiture petition filed by the Republic against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, and son, alleging he unlawfully acquired properties while a public officer, with some titles recorded under his family members’ names.
The trial court jointly tried the cases. It dismissed the Katigbaks’ complaint for injunction and damages. In the forfeiture case, it imposed a lien in favor of the government in the sum of P100,000 (later reduced to P80,000) on properties acquired by Katigbak in 1953-1955. The Katigbaks appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court, as it squarely raised the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1379.

ISSUE

The principal issue is whether Republic Act No. 1379, as applied to properties allegedly unlawfully acquired by a public officer before its enactment on June 18, 1955, constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that applying R.A. No. 1379’s forfeiture provision to acquisitions made before its passage is unconstitutional. The Court clarified the nature of the forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. Contrary to the trial court’s view that it was a civil recovery of property held in implied trust, the Supreme Court, citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., held that the forfeiture of property manifestly disproportionate to a public officer’s lawful income partakes of the nature of a penalty. Proceedings under the law, while civil in form, are deemed penal in character.
An ex post facto law includes one that makes criminal an act innocent when done or imposes a penalty for a prior lawful act. Since the forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 is penal, applying it to acquisitions made before the law’s existence would punish an act that was not unlawful at the time it was committed. This violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Consequently, the trial court’s imposition of a lien on properties acquired in 1953-1955, based on R.A. No. 1379, was constitutionally impermissible and was reversed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the damage claims against the investigating prosecutor, finding no proof of malice or bad faith.