GR 191000; (September, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 191000; September 15, 2010
JAREN TIBONG y CULLA-AG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Jaren Tibong was charged with attempted rape against his first cousin, AAA. The incident occurred on April 17, 2006, in La Trinidad, Benguet, where AAA was boarding in a house owned by petitioner’s parents. AAA testified that she was awakened around midnight to find petitioner, wearing only briefs, crouched over her on her bed, pulling down her pajamas and panties. He told her they would have sexual intercourse and to keep it secret. When she resisted, he mashed her breasts, forced her to lie down, and covered her mouth when she tried to shout. Petitioner then momentarily moved towards a CD player, at which point AAA seized the opportunity to grab her belongings, escape the house, and report the incident to the police the following morning. The defense presented an alibi, claiming petitioner was drinking with a friend during the time of the alleged incident.
ISSUE
Whether the acts committed by the petitioner constitute the crime of attempted rape, or merely acts of lasciviousness.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for attempted rape. The legal logic hinges on the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. While both crimes share a similar nature, rape requires the specific intent to have carnal knowledge. The Court found that petitioner’s overt acts—removing AAA’s clothing, holding her vagina, fondling her breasts, forcing her down, and explicitly stating his intention to have sexual intercourse—demonstrated a clear commencement of execution of rape with the intent to lie with her. These acts were not merely preparatory or lascivious but constituted direct overt acts towards carnal knowledge, which were not consummated only because AAA managed to escape, an external cause not amounting to spontaneous desistance. The defense’s reliance on Perez v. Court of Appeals was misplaced, as the circumstances here, including the explicit verbal declaration of intent and the physical actions forcing submission, sufficiently established the commencement of rape’s execution beyond mere acts of lasciviousness.
