GR 189122; (March, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with murder but was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition and claiming no risk of flight. The Court of Appeals denied his application, ruling that he failed to show an ailment so grave that continued confinement would permanently impair his health or endanger his life, and that his condition did not prevent him from seeking medical attention in prison. The appellate court also made a preliminary evaluation of the case and determined there was no substantial reason to overturn the evidence of guilt. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court held that the grant of bail pending appeal is discretionary, not automatic, even in the absence of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. The discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering the accused has already been convicted. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the application. It acted within its jurisdiction and its denial was based on a thorough assessment, including the petitioner’s claim of ill health and a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case. The appellate court’s exercise of discretion followed established jurisprudence and was not capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary. The Court further ruled that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper to correct errors of judgment but only to address grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which was not present in this case.
