G.R. No. 187113 & G.R. No. 187230, January 11, 2021
RAFFY T. TULFO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, RESPONDENT. [G.R. No. 187230] ALLEN A. MACASAET AND NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. CARLOS T. SO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

These consolidated criminal cases originated from 14 Informations for libel filed against Raffy T. Tulfo (columnist), Allen A. Macasaet (publisher), and Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr. (managing editor) of the Abante Tonite column “Shoot to Kill.” The column covered stories on the alleged anomalous dealings of Atty. Carlos “Ding” So of the Bureau of Customs. The articles, published in March to May 1999, imputed that Atty. So was an extortionist, corrupt public official, smuggler, and had illegally acquired wealth, citing specific instances such as broker strikes due to his extortion activities, his protection of alleged smuggler Jerry Yap, his ownership of multiple vehicles and a mansion despite a modest government salary, and his adulterous affairs. Atty. So filed Complaint-Affidavits, leading to the filing of 14 Informations for libel. The petitioners assailed a portion of the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision that affirmed convictions for six of the 14 counts of libel.

ISSUE

The issue involves the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on libel vis-à-vis the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, particularly concerning statements involving public officers in the exercise of their official functions.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petitions and reversed the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision. The Court held that all the elements of libel were not sufficiently established. The published articles constituted privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code as fair and true reports on the conduct of a public officer in the exercise of his functions. Atty. So, as Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service, was a public officer, and the articles pertained to his official conduct and alleged corruption. The prosecution failed to prove actual malice, defined as publishing with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The subject matters were of public concern, and the petitioners, as journalists, enjoyed a wide latitude of discretion. The Court emphasized the need to protect freedom of speech and of the press, stating that liability should attach only if the article was written and published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Commentaries on public affairs, even if crude or boorish when directed against unscrupulous officials, are protected. The Court also noted that the failure to verify sources does not necessarily prove malice, and the defense of privilege communication under Republic Act No. 53 (The Sotto Law) was applicable, protecting journalists from being compelled to reveal their sources. The Informations were quashed and the accused were acquitted.