GR 185920; (July, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 185920; July 20, 2010
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners, vs. DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO ANTENOR, Respondents.
FACTS
Respondents, former employees, secured a final and executory Labor Arbiter decision for illegal dismissal and monetary awards against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc. and its owner, Ernesto M. Ramos. To satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff levied on a Pandacan, Manila property registered in Ramos’s name. Ramos (later substituted by his heirs, the petitioners) moved to quash the writ of execution, claiming the property was the family home and thus exempt. Respondents countered that the family resided in Antipolo, the Pandacan property was used as the company’s business address, and even if it were a family home, only ₱300,000 of its value was exempt.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC denied the motion to quash. Pending appeal at the Court of Appeals, Ramos died. The appellate court denied the appeal, ruling the property was not exempt from execution. It held that for family residences occupied prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there was still a necessity to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code provisions, which petitioners failed to do.
ISSUE
Whether the Pandacan property is exempt from execution as a family home.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the appellate court’s ruling that the levy was valid. The legal logic hinges on the applicable law governing the constitution of the family home. The Court clarified that Article 153 of the Family Code, which provides for the automatic constitution of a family home from the time a house and lot are occupied as a family residence, applies only prospectively. For family residences already occupied prior to the Family Code’s effectivity on August 3, 1988, the governing law is found in Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code. Under this regime, a family home must be formally constituted, either judicially or extrajudicially by recording a public instrument in the Registry of Property, to enjoy exemption from execution.
Since the petitioners failed to present any evidence that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home under the Civil Code, no such exemption attached. The claim of automatic constitution under the Family Code was unavailing for a residence occupied long before the code’s effectivity. Consequently, the property was rightfully levied upon to satisfy the final judgment debt arising from the illegal dismissal case.