G.R. No. 185160; July 24, 2013
POLYMER RUBBER CORPORATION and JOSEPH ANG, Petitioners, vs. BAYOLO SALAMUDING, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Bayolo Salamuding, along with other employees, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Polymer Rubber Corporation and its director, Joseph Ang. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees, ordering reinstatement with back wages and other monetary awards. This decision was affirmed with modifications by the NLRC and later by the Supreme Court, which deleted certain awards. Polymer ceased operations in 1993. In 2005, after a series of alias writs, the Labor Arbiter issued a fifth alias writ of execution, leading to the levy of Ang’s personal shares of stock in another corporation to satisfy the judgment award. Petitioners moved to quash the writ, arguing Ang was not held personally liable in the final judgments and that execution was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Labor Arbiter granted the motion, quashing the writ and lifting the levy on Ang’s shares, a decision affirmed by the NLRC. The NLRC, however, clarified that the right to execute was not barred by prescription due to the complainants’ continuous efforts. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ang, as a corporate director and the highest-ranking officer, could be held jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the monetary awards, invoking the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether Joseph Ang can be held jointly and severally liable for the corporation’s monetary obligations to its illegally dismissed employees, and whether the execution against his personal assets was proper.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the NLRC decision. The Court held that Ang could not be held personally liable. The final and executory decisions of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Supreme Court contained no finding of personal liability against Ang; they named only Polymer Rubber Corporation as the liable party. A writ of execution must conform to the judgment it seeks to enforce and cannot vary its terms. To hold Ang liable at the execution stage would amount to an unauthorized amendment of a final judgment.
The Court further clarified that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, invoked by the CA, was inapplicable. This doctrine requires proof that the corporation is a mere alter ego, and that it is used for fraudulent or wrongful purposes. No such factual finding was made in any of the prior final decisions. Ang’s status as a corporate director alone does not justify personal liability for corporate obligations. The Court also affirmed the NLRC’s finding that the right to execute was not barred by prescription, as the employees actively pursued execution. However, it remanded the case for proper recomputation of back wages, limiting it to the period up to the legitimate cessation of Polymer’s business operations.