G.R. No. 185121 ; January 18, 2010
LIMANCH-O HOTEL AND LEASING CORPORATION and CONRADO TIU, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF OLONGAPO, ATTY. MA. ELLEN AGUILAR, ENGR. RAMON ZAVALLA, ENGR. ANDREW DAYOT, and ENGR. REYNALDO EDRAISA, Respondents.

FACTS

In 1993, the City of Olongapo assessed petitioner Conrado Tiu (owner/president/general manager of petitioner Limanch-O Hotel and Leasing Corporation) for alleged unregistered electricity consumption from November 1988 to February 1993, threatening to cut off his electric supply. Tiu filed an injunction case against the City and won, with the RTC enjoining the City from collecting and cutting off power. Pending its motion for reconsideration, the City filed criminal complaints against Tiu for theft of electrical current under P.D. 401 and for tampering with his electric meter under a city ordinance. After preliminary investigation, the state prosecutor dismissed the complaints for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Acting Secretary of Justice initially directed the filing of an information but the Secretary of Justice later reconsidered and ordered its withdrawal. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the dismissal of the criminal complaints. Petitioners then filed an action for damages against the City for malicious prosecution, claiming mental anguish, besmirched reputation, and business losses. The RTC granted the City’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint, a decision affirmed by the CA. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence showing that respondent City instituted the criminal complaint for theft of electricity maliciously and without probable cause.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. To succeed in a malicious prosecution suit, petitioners needed to prove: (1) the City caused their prosecution; (2) the action ended in acquittal/dismissal; (3) the City had no probable cause; and (4) it was impelled by legal malice. While the first two elements were present, petitioners failed to prove the last two. The City did not concoct the charge; it acted based on an investigation at Tiu’s premises indicating meter tampering. The Supreme Court’s prior affirmation of the dismissal did not constitute a judicial determination of the absence of probable cause, but only a review for grave abuse of discretion by the Secretary of Justice. The fact that the DOJ initially found basis for filing the charge indicates probable cause was not clearly absent. No evidence showed prior bad blood between the parties that would indicate a malicious motive. The City’s acts (e.g., branding Tiu a thief, calling for a boycott, being zealous in prosecution) are not the “legal malice” required, which focuses on the evil motive in initiating the action, not acts after filing. Resort to judicial processes is not by itself evidence of ill will.