G.R. No. 18501 ; January 20, 1923
DOLORES BENEDICTO DE TARROSA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. F. M. YAP TICO & CO., and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF OCCIDENTAL NEGROS, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Wenceslao Tarrosa owed F. M. Yap Tico & Co. a balance of P13,486.72, secured by a mortgage on sugar cane. For non-payment, the creditor attached properties of the debtor, including sugar cane plantations, firewood, rajas, and a steam boiler. Third-party claims were filed: (1) by Dionisio Luzuriaga Dy Chiamco, alleging a prior mortgage on the plantations from Dolores Benedicto (Wenceslao’s wife) and Wenceslao; and (2) by Isidoro Escares, alleging a later mortgage on the sugar cane. Other plaintiffs (Catalino Palma, et al.) claimed to be coparceners (sharers) of Dolores Benedicto entitled to half of the plantation. Dolores Benedicto also claimed the attached properties. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs-coparceners were entitled to one-third of the plantations; declared Luzuriaga’s mortgage void; gave Escares a preferential right over two-thirds of the plantations; ordered Yap Tico & Co. to pay specific amounts to the coparceners; and absolved defendants from the claims of Dolores Benedicto and Luzuriaga. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the attached properties (boiler, firewood, rajas) belonged exclusively to Dolores Benedicto and whether she should be reimbursed for cultivation expenses.
2. Whether the mortgage in favor of Dionisio Luzuriaga is valid and preferential.
3. Whether defendants are liable for a shortage in sugar yield due to alleged delayed milling.
4. Whether the coparcener-plaintiffs had legal capacity to bring the action.
5. Whether Isidoro Escares has a preferential right over the attached sugar cane.

RULING

1. No. The evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption that the attached properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses Wenceslao Tarrosa and Dolores Benedicto. Thus, they were liable for the debt to Yap Tico & Co.
2. No. The mortgage in favor of Luzuriaga was void for lack of the oath required by law ( Act No. 1508 , sec. 5). Following Giberson vs. A. N. Jureidini Bros., such a defect renders the mortgage ineffective against third persons. It could not be preferential over Escares’ mortgage or the attachment.
3. No. The evidence did not sufficiently establish defendants’ negligence. The delay in milling was satisfactorily explained.
4. Yes. The coparcener-plaintiffs had legal capacity. While they did not present their claim to the sheriff, Section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not prevent a third person from vindicating his claim by a proper action.
5. Yes. Escares’ mortgage was executed before the attachment was levied. There was no proof it was executed to frustrate the attachment. The presumption of good faith stood unrebutted, so his preferential right was upheld.
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.