G.R. No. 184109; February 1, 2012
CELERINO E. MERCADO, Petitioner, vs. BELEN ESPINOCILLA AND FERDINAND ESPINOCILLA, Respondents.

FACTS

Doroteo Espinocilla owned a 570-square-meter lot. Upon his death, his five children—Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia—orally partitioned it, each receiving 114 sq. m. Dionisia died without issue in 1945. Macario subsequently claimed her entire share via a 1948 affidavit, asserting a 1945 donation. In 1977, Macario sold a portion to his son Roger, husband of respondent Belen and father of respondent Ferdinand. Petitioner Celerino Mercado, son of Salvacion, filed a complaint in 2000 for recovery of possession, claiming he inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother (114 sq. m. from Doroteo plus a 28.5 sq. m. share from Dionisia) and purchased an additional 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren, totaling 171 sq. m. He alleged that respondents encroached on 39 sq. m. of his rightful share, as he only physically possessed 132 sq. m.
The Regional Trial Court ruled for petitioner, declaring Macario’s affidavit void for lack of a public document and finding no valid repudiation of the co-ownership over Dionisia’s share. It ordered partition to identify the 39 sq. m. for recovery. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. It found that the oral partition in 1945, which divided the lot only among the four surviving siblings, effectively terminated the co-ownership and included Dionisia’s share. Thus, Macario’s possession became adverse from that point.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner’s action to recover the alleged encroached portion is barred by prescription.

RULING

Yes, the action is barred by prescription. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal. The legal logic rests on two distinct prescriptive periods. First, upon Dionisia’s death in 1945, a co-ownership over her 114 sq. m. share arose among her four surviving siblings. Macario’s exclusive claim and possession through the 1948 affidavit constituted a clear repudiation of this co-ownership. An action for judicial partition, which is imprescriptible while co-ownership is expressly recognized, becomes subject to the rules on prescription once the co-ownership is repudiated. The prescriptive period for an action to enforce the right to a share based on such repudiation is ten years. Petitioner’s mother and her siblings failed to assert their claim within ten years of Macario’s 1948 repudiation.
Second, the action is also barred by extinctive prescription. Petitioner’s suit, filed in 2000, is essentially one for reconveyance based on an implied trust, arising from Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of his sisters’ shares. Such an action prescribes in ten years from the accrual of the right of action, which began in 1948. Having been filed 55 years later, the complaint is unequivocally time-barred. The Court emphasized that while Macario’s act was condemnable, his sisters’ prolonged inaction extinguished their right to recover.