G.R. No. L-18390 December 20, 1971
PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

This is a resolution on motions for reconsideration of a prior Supreme Court decision. Appellant Pedro J. Velasco sued Manila Electric Company (Meralco) for damages due to nuisance caused by excessive noise from Meralco’s substation adjacent to his property. The Court’s main decision partially granted Velasco’s claim but awarded reduced damages. Velasco now moves for reconsideration, arguing the damages awarded are insufficient. He contends the Court erred in not including an undeclared income amount assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for 1954 when computing his loss of professional earnings. He also invokes Article 1250 of the Civil Code on currency inflation and cites the high cost of living to seek increased damages.
Separately, appellee Meralco also moves for reconsideration. Meralco argues that if it cannot comply with the Court’s order to reduce the substation noise to a 50-decibel level, the remedy should be for the court to compel Velasco to sell his house to Meralco under the doctrine of “inverse condemnation.” Meralco also petitions to increase the permissible sound level from 50 to 55 decibels.

ISSUE

The issues are: (1) Whether the Court erred in its computation of damages and in refusing to increase the award based on undeclared income, inflation, or cost of living; and (2) Whether the Court should apply the inverse condemnation doctrine or modify its noise abatement order.

RULING

The Court denied both motions. On appellant’s motion, the Court held the undeclared income was correctly excluded. Circumstantial evidence showed it was not ordinary professional income, as including it would make Velasco’s 1954 earnings abnormally high compared to prior years. Velasco, who had knowledge of its source, chose not to disclose it. The Court ruled Article 1250 on extraordinary inflation is inapplicable as it governs contractual obligations, not torts like this nuisance case, and no such inflation was proven. The Pantoja case doctrine on the peso’s purchasing power was distinguished as applicable to indemnities for loss of life, not to reduced damage awards where the plaintiff failed to mitigate his losses. The claimed lost sale opportunity was not proven as a direct loss caused by the nuisance.
On appellee’s motion, the Court refused to apply inverse condemnation. This issue was not raised in the trial court and is improper for consideration for the first time on a motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, there was no showing that reducing noise to 50 decibels was impossible; Meralco’s own evidence suggested a barrier wall could achieve it. The objection of Velasco’s wife to a wall did not constitute a waiver of his claim. The request to increase the noise level to 55 decibels was denied, as the evidence showed the noise was most objectionable at night when lower levels are necessary for rest.