G.R. No. 183591 , October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PINOL, for and in his own behalf vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

FACTS

The case involves petitions seeking to restrain the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The historical context traces the Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao, beginning with the 1968 Jabidah Massacre, the formation of groups like the Muslim Independence Movement and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the subsequent peace negotiations. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF was implemented through presidential proclamation and legislation, leading to the creation of autonomous regions. A schism within the MNLF led to the formation of the MILF. Subsequent administrations pursued peace talks with both groups. The GRP and MILF signed the Tripoli Agreement on Peace in 2001, focusing on ancestral domain. Exploratory talks continued, and on July 27, 2008, a Joint Statement announced that the final draft of the MOA-AD had been initialed and was set for signing in early August 2008. This triggered the filing of petitions. On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to stop the signing. During oral arguments, the Solicitor General informed the Court that the MOA-AD would not be signed “in its present form or any other form,” and the government Peace Panel was subsequently dismantled.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its power of judicial review and decide the petitions on their merits, given that the MOA-AD will no longer be signed.

RULING

Chief Justice Puno, in his separate concurring opinion, submits that the Court should exercise judicial review and decide the petitions on their merits due to their transcendental importance. He argues that the subject of review is not merely the MOA-AD document but the entire constitutionally flawed peace process that led to its creation. The review should encompass the conduct of the peace negotiations, which commenced with ceasefire agreements and was guided by Executive Order No. 3, which outlined a comprehensive peace process that could require administrative action, new legislation, or constitutional amendments. The MOA-AD itself, as reflected in the provided text, references instruments like the Tripoli Agreement, Republic Acts, and international conventions, indicating its intended legal and political significance. Therefore, the Court has a duty to scrutinize the process to ensure it complies with the Constitution, as a peace achieved in breach of the Constitution is deemed “worse than worthless.”