GR 182937; (August, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 182937; August 8, 2010
ERNESTO VILLEZA, Petitioner, vs. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES, INC., et al., Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto Villeza prevailed in a forcible entry case against respondent German Management, with the Supreme Court decision becoming final and executory on October 5, 1989. On May 27, 1991, Villeza filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. However, on February 27, 1992, he filed a Motion to Defer Resolution, citing his permanent assignment in Iloilo. The MeTC granted this, holding the motion in abeyance. No further action was taken for over three years, leading the MeTC to deny the motion for lack of interest on January 9, 1995.
More than three years later, on May 29, 1998, Villeza filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The MeTC issued a writ of execution on October 8, 1998, but it was subsequently quashed on June 3, 1999, as execution by motion was no longer allowed after five years from the judgment’s entry. Villeza then filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment on October 3, 2000. Respondents moved to dismiss, arguing the action was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations from the judgment’s finality.
ISSUE
Whether the action for revival of judgment was filed within the prescriptive period.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling the action was barred by prescription. An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The prescriptive period is ten years from the time the right of action accrues, which, under Article 1152, commences from the time the judgment became final—here, October 5, 1989. Villeza filed his complaint on October 3, 2000, nearly eleven years later, thus exceeding the limit.
The Court rejected Villeza’s argument that the MeTC’s grant of his motion to defer in 1992 tolled the prescriptive period. The delay was solely attributable to Villeza, the prevailing party, who slept on his rights. The exceptions allowing extensions, such as delays caused by the judgment debtor, do not apply. The purpose of statutes of limitation is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Equity cannot be invoked to set aside these limits when inaction spans over a decade. The right to enforce the judgment was therefore lost.