G.R. No. 182865; December 24, 2008
ROMULO F. PECSON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT and LYNDON A. CUNANAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Romulo F. Pecson and private respondent Lyndon A. Cunanan were candidates for mayor of Magalang, Pampanga in the May 2007 elections. Cunanan was proclaimed the winner by a margin of 61 votes, took his oath, and assumed office. Pecson filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Angeles City. On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Pecson, finding he received 14,897 votes against Cunanan’s 13,758, a margin of 1,139 votes. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal on November 27, 2007. On November 28, 2007, Pecson filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal. The RTC granted the motion via a Special Order dated December 3, 2007, citing the clearly established victory, public interest, the will of the electorate, and public policy to avoid a “grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest” scenario. Cunanan filed a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction with the COMELEC, arguing the RTC’s decision did not clearly establish victory and that the RTC had lost jurisdiction after ordering the transmittal of records. The COMELEC Second Division initially denied Cunanan’s petition, finding good reasons for execution pending appeal and recalculating the vote margin to 384 in Pecson’s favor due to a mathematical error in the RTC’s formula. The RTC then issued a writ of execution on March 11, 2008, and Pecson assumed office. The COMELEC en banc, however, issued the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 2008, reversing the Second Division and nullifying the grant of execution pending appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the RTC’s Special Order granting execution pending appeal of its Decision in the election protest.

RULING

Yes, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the COMELEC en banc Resolution, and reinstated the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution which affirmed the RTC’s Special Order. The Court held that the RTC’s stated reasons for granting execution pending appeal—the clearly established victory of the protestant, the need to give recognition to the trial court’s decision as akin to the board of canvassers’ proclamation, respect for public interest and the electorate’s will, and the public policy against prolonging protests—constitute “good reasons” as required by the Rules. The COMELEC en banc’s finding that these reasons were “general” and did not constitute “superior circumstances” amounted to a substitution of its own judgment for that of the trial court, which had discretion in the matter. The Court further ruled that the RTC retained residual jurisdiction to resolve the motion for execution pending appeal, as it was filed before the expiration of the period to appeal and while the court was still in possession of the original records. The transmittal of records after the motion was resolved did not divest the RTC of this authority. The COMELEC en banc’s reversal, based on a re-evaluation of the factual and legal bases already deemed sufficient by the trial court and the COMELEC Second Division, was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment constituting grave abuse of discretion.