G.R. No. 182371; September 4, 2013
HEIRS OF MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA (represented by LEONORA, VIRGILIO and VILMA, all surnamed YU), Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL TWENTY-FIRST DIVISION (TWENTY-SECOND DIVISION); ROSEMARIE D. ANACAN-DIZON (in her capacity as Division Clerk of Court); MARION C. MIRABUENO (in her capacity as OIC-Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City), and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION NONANDRES (represented by GRACELDA N. ANDRES), Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, the Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, are the registered and absolute owners of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd in General Santos City, as definitively established in Civil Case No. 1291. The Supreme Court, in Heirs of John Z. Sycip v. Court of Appeals, sustained this final and executory judgment. During the pendency of that case, squatters occupied the lot. After prevailing in related cases against the squatter group Yard Urban Homeowners Association, Inc. (YUHAI) in Civil Case No. 4647, the trial court (RTC Br. 23) issued a Special Order of Demolition on August 22, 2001, to enforce the judgments in both cases. Private respondents, the Heirs of Concepcion Non Andres, who were not parties to Civil Case Nos. 1291 or 4647, filed a separate complaint for quieting of title (Civil Case No. 7066) and sought to stop the demolition. On December 27, 2006, petitioners moved to resume the demolition, which the RTC (Br. 36) granted on October 9, 2007. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN) before the Court of Appeals (CA) to set aside this order. The CA initially issued a TRO but later vacated it as moot after the RTC reported the demolition was completed on December 13, 2007. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the demolition was incomplete and there was no proper turnover. On April 3, 2008, the CA granted their prayer and issued a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, ordering petitioners to restore possession of the lot to private respondents pending litigation. Petitioners sought to set aside this writ.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated April 3, 2008, which granted private respondents possession pendente lite of the contested lot.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled and set aside the CA’s April 3, 2008 Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and made permanent the temporary restraining order issued by the Court. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
1. Legal Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction Not Met: A preliminary mandatory injunction, which commands the performance of a particular act, is an extraordinary remedy issued only upon a clear showing of (a) a right in esse (a clear and unmistakable right); (b) a violation of that right; and (c) an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Private respondents failed to establish a clear legal right to the possession of the lot. Their claim is based on a pending action for quieting of title (Civil Case No. 7066), which merely asserts a claim but does not constitute a vested right. In contrast, petitioners’ ownership and right to possession have been conclusively settled by a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 1291, which is binding on the whole world. The CA’s order effectively allowed a mere claimant to dispossess the established owner based on an unproven allegation, violating the principle that injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse.
2. Violation of the Principle of Judicial Stability (Non-Interference): The CA’s injunction interfered with the lawful orders of the RTC (Branch 36) which was executing a final judgment. The RTC’s October 9, 2007 Order directing the completion of the demolition was issued pursuant to the final judgments in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647. A co-equal court (the CA, in this exercise of its jurisdiction) should not enjoin the execution of a final judgment, as this undermines judicial stability. The proper remedy for private respondents, who were not parties to the original cases, was not an injunction against execution, but to pursue their claim in a separate action (which they did in Civil Case No. 7066) without obstructing the enforcement of a settled right.
3. The Injunction Altered the Status Quo: The status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested state of affairs preceding the controversy. Prior to the CA’s order, the last actual peaceable status was petitioners being the adjudged owners entitled to possession, with the demolition having been reportedly completed to enforce that right. The CA’s writ, which ordered petitioners to surrender possession to private respondents, radically altered this status quo by transferring possession based on a claim yet to be proven. A preliminary injunction must preserve, not change, the status quo.
Therefore, the CA’s issuance of the writ was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting to grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.