G.R. No. 181851; March 9, 2010
CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, Petitioner, vs. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL (ADT) OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B. DOCENA; EDEN PERDIDO; ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS OF THE ADT; and IMELDA O. ABUTAL, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero, an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the PGH Security Division, was administratively charged with Grave Misconduct by private respondent Imelda O. Abutal, a security guard applicant. The charge alleged that in April 1996, petitioner proposed that if Abutal agreed to be his mistress, he would facilitate her application. Petitioner was preventively suspended, and an Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) was convened. The prosecution presented Abutal as its only witness. After cross-examination, the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence by July 16, 1999, but failed to do so. Subsequent hearings were reset due to the prosecution’s non-appearance. On October 22, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to declare that complainant waived her right to formally offer exhibits. The ADT did not act on this motion for almost five years. On May 19, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing the prosecution’s failure to formally offer evidence, the ADT’s inaction on his 1999 motion, and his right to a speedy disposition. The prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits on January 24, 2004. On June 8, 2004, the ADT denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and admitted the prosecution’s exhibits. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on November 9, 2004. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s subsequent Petition for Certiorari, ruling the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the administrative case, and whether petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases was violated.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED and SET ASIDE the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, and ORDERED the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioner for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases. The Court held that while administrative tribunals are not bound by strict technical rules of procedure, the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases applies to administrative proceedings. The Court applied the balancing test, considering the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the respondent’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The delay of almost five years in resolving a simple motion, primarily attributable to the prosecution and the tribunal’s inaction, was deemed unreasonable and oppressive. The delay prejudiced petitioner, who remained under a cloud of suspicion and was prevented from pursuing his profession normally. Thus, the ADT’s inaction constituted a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right.