GR 181613; (November, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera was a candidate for Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte in the 2007 elections. A petition for her disqualification was filed, alleging she engaged in premature campaigning by participating in a motorcade on March 29, 2007, after filing her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 28, 2007, but before the start of the campaign period for local positions on March 30, 2007. The COMELEC disqualified Penera, a ruling initially affirmed by the Supreme Court in a September 11, 2009 Decision.
Penera filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing she could not be liable for premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code because she was not yet legally considered a “candidate” at the time of the alleged act. She contended that under the law, a person who files a COC is only considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and thus, prohibited acts applicable to candidates only take effect from that point.
ISSUE
Whether a person who files a certificate of candidacy can be held liable for premature campaigning for acts committed after filing the COC but before the start of the official campaign period.
RULING
The Supreme Court GRANTED the motion for reconsideration and REVERSED its earlier Decision, thereby absolving Penera of the charge of premature campaigning. The Court anchored its ruling on a harmonized interpretation of Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code and the amendatory provisions in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 .
The law explicitly provides that any person who files a COC “shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period” for which the COC was filed. A crucial proviso immediately follows, stating that “unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.” The Court held that these provisions are clear and must be given their plain meaning. Therefore, before the campaign period starts, a COC filer is not yet legally a “candidate” as defined for purposes of applying election offenses like premature campaigning under Section 80.
The Court clarified that the offense of premature campaigning requires the confluence of three elements: (1) a person engages in an election campaign; (2) the act is designed to promote the election of a particular candidate; and (3) the act is done outside the campaign period. The second element necessitates the existence of a “candidate.” Since the law now expressly states that a COC filer becomes a candidate only at the campaign period’s start, acts done prior to that date, even if promotional, cannot be legally ascribed to a “candidate” for the purpose of Section 80 liability. The assailed acts occurred on March 29, 2007, while the campaign period began on March 30, 2007. Consequently, Penera was not yet a candidate at the time, and the charge of premature campaigning could not prosper.