G.R. No. 180988; August 28, 2009
JULIE’S FRANCHISE CORPORATION, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. CHANDLER O. RUIZ, ET AL., and RICHARD EMMANUEL G. DANCEL, Respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Richard Emmanuel G. Dancel entered into franchise agreements with petitioner Julie’s Franchise Corporation for three bakeshop outlets. After favorable evaluations, Dancel paid renewal fees for a new five-year term in 2004. However, petitioner corporation later informed him of the termination of the agreements, effective June 30, 2005. Dancel filed a complaint for Specific Performance with a prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City to prevent the termination. The RTC initially denied the application for injunction, citing lack of jurisdiction. This denial was overturned by the Court of Appeals, which directed the RTC to issue the writ, a decision that became final after the Supreme Court denied petitioner’s appeal for late filing.
Subsequently, the RTC (Branch 10, Judge Ruiz) issued the assailed Joint Resolution denying petitioner corporation’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, and granting Dancel’s application for a preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari, challenging these orders and also seeking to restrain another RTC branch (Branch 9, Judge Bautista) from proceeding with an indirect contempt case filed by Dancel against them.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) not dismissing the case via summary judgment based on judicial admissions and for lack of cause of action, and (2) not granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the petitioner corporation to protect its intellectual property rights.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the first issue, the Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment. Such an order does not terminate the proceedings, and the aggrieved party’s remedy is an ordinary appeal after a judgment on the merits. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion, as the existence of genuine factual issues regarding the validity of the franchise termination precluded summary judgment. Judicial admissions cited by petitioners were not unequivocal and did not eliminate the need for a full trial on the merits.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Its findings, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great respect. The appellate court had already conclusively ruled that Dancel was entitled to the injunction, a decision which had attained finality. Petitioners could not relitigate this matter. Furthermore, the Court declined to resolve the ancillary plea to enjoin the indirect contempt proceedings, as it was improperly raised in a petition for certiorari and should be the subject of a separate petition for prohibition.