GR 180819; (July, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 180819; July 5, 2010
AMIHAN BUS LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION, represented by CHARLIE J. SAPUGAY; Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Iriga City, presided by HON. MILAGROS G. QUIJANO; and SAMUEL S. SANTAYANA, Respondents.
FACTS
A collision occurred between petitioner Amihan Bus Lines’ bus and respondent Romars International Gases Corporation’s gas tanker on February 20, 2005. Romars filed a complaint for damages, alleging the bus suddenly took the tanker’s lane on a curve. Amihan, in its answer, claimed it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. The procedural history, however, became central. After multiple resettings for pre-trial due to Amihan’s counsel’s non-appearances, the RTC eventually allowed Romars to present evidence ex-parte when Amihan’s counsel again failed to appear on August 31, 2006. Amihan later filed a motion to present evidence, claiming its counsel had withdrawn and it was not informed of the hearing. The RTC denied this motion as a lame excuse unsupported by records and subsequently rendered a judgment in favor of Romars based on the ex-parte evidence, finding the bus driver negligent.
ISSUE
Whether the negligence of petitioner’s counsel constitutes extrinsic fraud warranting the annulment of the RTC’s judgment.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that the negligence of counsel did not amount to extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud involves a fraudulent act committed outside the trial that prevents a party from presenting its case, such as deception keeping a party away from court. The Court distinguished this from intrinsic fraud, which pertains to matters litigated or that could have been litigated within the trial. Here, Amihan’s counsel’s repeated failures to appear at pre-trial conferences and the subsequent inaction in timely seeking reconsideration constituted mere negligence intrinsic to the proceedings. The Court emphasized that a client is generally bound by the mistakes of its counsel, and the negligence in this case was not so gross, palpable, and inexcusable as to violate Amihan’s substantive rights to due process. The RTC had shown considerable forbearance through multiple resettings, and Amihan’s own lack of vigilance in monitoring its case contributed to the outcome. Therefore, the default judgment and its execution were valid.