GR 180164; (June, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 180164; June 17, 2008
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Florentino P. Blanco was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections due to vote-buying, a ruling affirmed by the Supreme Court in Blanco v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 122258). In subsequent elections, the COMELEC issued conflicting resolutions on his eligibility. In 1998, it dismissed a disqualification petition, ruling the 1995 disqualification was effective only for that election. However, in 2001, it disqualified Blanco under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code for having been “removed from office” via an administrative case. Blanco later obtained a favorable declaratory judgment from the Regional Trial Court declaring him eligible.
In the 2007 elections, respondent Alarilla again sought Blanco’s disqualification. The COMELEC Second Division, in its August 28, 2007 Resolution, disqualified Blanco, citing both the 1995 Supreme Court ruling and its own 2001 Resolution. It also noted Blanco had not received presidential clemency. Blanco filed this certiorari petition directly with the Supreme Court, bypassing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC Second Division committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner from the 2007 elections.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, nullifying the COMELEC Resolution. On procedural grounds, the Court exercised its power of judicial review despite the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The Court found that the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution was a patent nullity due to grave abuse of discretion, constituting an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
On the merits, the Court held the COMELEC’s reliance on the 1995 disqualification was erroneous. The disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, as affirmed in G.R. No. 122258, was limited to the 1995 elections only and did not impose a perpetual disqualification. Furthermore, the COMELEC’s 2001 Resolution, which invoked Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (disqualifying those “removed from office as a result of an administrative case”), was incorrectly applied. The Court clarified that Blanco’s 1995 disqualification was a penalty for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code, not a removal from office via an administrative case as contemplated by the Local Government Code. An administrative case implies a proceeding where one is charged administratively, which did not occur here. Therefore, Blanco was not disqualified under Section 40(b). The COMELEC’s persistent disregard of this clear distinction and its contradictory prior rulings constituted grave abuse of discretion.