G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

FACTS

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration over a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite, which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco. He claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and notorious possession for over 30 years. To prove the land was alienable and disposable, he presented a CENRO certification stating the land was classified as such on March 15, 1982. The RTC granted the application.
The Republic appealed, and the CA reversed the RTC, dismissing the application. The CA, citing Republic v. Herbieto, ruled that possession prior to the land’s classification as alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982, could not be counted towards the required period under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The heirs of Malabanan elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the ruling in Republic v. Naguit should control, allowing possession prior to classification to be counted.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners have sufficiently established their right to registration of title under either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration and upheld the denial of the application. The Court clarified the distinct requirements for registration under Section 14(1) and Section 14(2). For Section 14(1), which governs confirmation of imperfect title, the applicant must prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court held that the alienable and disposable character of the land must exist as of June 12, 1945. Since the CENRO certification only confirmed classification on March 15, 1982, the petitioners failed to prove the land was alienable during the required statutory period. Possession prior to the 1982 classification is inconsequential.
For Section 14(2), which applies to lands already considered private through prescription under the Civil Code, the Court ruled that acquisitive prescription can only run against the State if the land is patrimonial. A land of the public domain is only converted to patrimonial property of the State either upon a declaration that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth, or upon its registration. Since there was no such express declaration or prior registration, the land remained part of the public domain, not susceptible to acquisitive prescription. Therefore, the petitioners could not register the land under either provision.