GR 179261; (April, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 179261; April 14, 2008
THE OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioners, vs. BEATRIZ S. PELIĂ‘O, respondent.
FACTS
On May 11, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against respondent Beatriz S. Peliño, head of the BIR Large Taxpayers’ Document Processing and Quality Assurance Division, and her son Joseph Albert Peliño Cuaki. The complaint charged Peliño with 18 counts of perjury, violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards), dishonesty and grave misconduct, and violation of Republic Act No. 1379 (Unexplained Wealth Act). The charges stemmed from allegations that Peliño illegally acquired and accumulated properties and investments grossly disproportionate to her income as a government employee and failed to disclose them in her annual Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) from 1986 to 2003. The specific properties included a house and lot in Pasig City, two lots in Quezon City, a condominium unit in San Juan registered in her young son’s name, a house and lot in Antipolo City, a building and lot in Cavite, several parcels of land in Cavite and Tagaytay City, an interest in a corporation, and vehicles. The complaint also alleged frequent foreign travels and an aggregate unexplained wealth of approximately P10.9 million. Additionally, Peliño was charged with dishonesty for omitting to declare her son in her Personal Data Sheet and claiming she was single. The Ombudsman, in an Order dated August 31, 2005, preventively suspended Peliño for six months, finding the evidence of guilt for dishonesty and grave misconduct to be strong. Peliño filed motions to lift the suspension, arguing the accusations were based on conclusory facts, the alleged acts were not directly related to her official duties, and the evidence of guilt was not strong. The Ombudsman denied her motions. Peliño then filed a petition for injunction with the Court of Appeals, which granted a writ of preliminary injunction and later made it permanent, enjoining the enforcement of the preventive suspension order. The Ombudsman and the CIR filed the present petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in making permanent the writ of injunction that enjoined the enforcement of the Ombudsman’s Order preventively suspending respondent Peliño.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the Ombudsman’s Order of preventive suspension dated August 31, 2005.
The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order. The power to preventively suspend is conferred upon the Ombudsman by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which may be exercised pending an investigation if the evidence of guilt is strong and the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or if the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case. The Court found that the charges against Peliño for dishonesty and grave misconduct, based on her failure to file truthful SALNs and disclose her assets and family circumstances, were substantiated by documentary evidence. Her alleged unexplained wealth, evidenced by numerous properties acquired during her government service, and her misrepresentation in her Personal Data Sheet regarding her civil status and child, constituted a prima facie case of dishonesty. Dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. The Court ruled that the evidence of guilt was strong, warranting preventive suspension. It further held that the charges were directly connected to her office as they involved her qualifications and integrity as a public officer. The Court also clarified that the propriety of a preventive suspension order is determined by the existence of a prima facie case based on the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation, not on a full-blown trial. The Ombudsman’s finding of strong evidence was supported by the records, and Peliño’s defenses pertained to the merits of the case to be fully addressed in the main administrative proceedings. Therefore, the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was improper.