G.R. No. 179003 & G.R. No. 195816, January 9, 2013
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA TANJUTCO, and JULIE O. CUA, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio L. Tan, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for falsification against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina Tanjutco, and Atty. Julie Cua. Tan alleged that a pre-signed Deed of Trust, which was blank as to date, number of shares, and witnesses, was stolen from him. He claimed that Matsuura and Tanjutco subsequently filled in these blanks and caused the document to be notarized by Cua on a date when he did not personally appear before her. The respondents countered that the deed was part of a compromise to settle an intra-corporate dispute, with Matsuura asserting it was Tan who offered the shares and Cua maintaining she notarized the document in good faith after a person identifying himself as Tan presented his community tax certificate.
The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, a ruling affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary found Tan’s bare allegations insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in the notarization and to prove the elements of falsification. Tan then filed petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) to challenge the DOJ resolutions. The CA dismissed both petitions for being filed out of time, counting the 60-day reglementary period from Tan’s receipt of the Secretary’s resolution, not from the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitions for certiorari on the ground of prescription.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is reckoned from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. If a motion for reconsideration is filed, the period is counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The Court clarified that this rule applies uniformly, regardless of whether the motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for filing the certiorari petition. In this case, Tan received the Secretary of Justice’s resolution on April 21, 2003, and filed his motion for reconsideration on May 6, 2003. He received the denial on August 11, 2003. His petition for certiorari before the CA was filed only on October 10, 2003, which was 60 days from August 11. However, the CA correctly noted that the 60-day period should have been counted from April 21, 2003, the date he received the assailed resolution, as the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the DOJ is not a mandatory requirement. Consequently, whether counted from April 21 or from May 6 (the date he actually filed his motion), the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. The Court emphasized that procedural rules are designed to ensure the orderly administration of justice, and their strict application in this instance was warranted.