G.R. No. 178635, April 11, 2011
SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Servillano Abad and his wife bought a registered property in Quezon City from Teresita Farrales and her sons on August 6, 2002. The property was being used as a boarding house. The Abads immediately leased the property back to Teresita. Teresita later abandoned the boarding house, and the Abads engaged her helper to oversee it. On December 8, 2002, respondents Oscar and Daisy Farrales (siblings of Teresita’s late husband) forcibly took possession of the property but left. They again forcibly entered and took possession on December 10, 2002. Abad filed a complaint for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) on March 10, 2003. Respondents claimed ownership by inheritance and prior physical possession since 1967, presenting a barangay certification and rental receipts from 2001-2003. They argued the MeTC lacked jurisdiction as Abad’s complaint failed to allege prior physical possession. The MeTC ruled for Abad, focusing on his ownership. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, annulling the lower courts’ decisions for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Abad’s complaint lacked the necessary allegation of prior physical possession and that respondents proved prior possession.

ISSUE

1. Whether Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action.
2. In the affirmative, whether Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the property.

RULING

1. On the sufficiency of the allegation: The Supreme Court held that Abad’s complaint sufficiently alleged prior physical possession. The complaint stated the property was one “of which they have complete physical and material possession of the same until deprived thereof.” The Court ruled that the plaintiff is not required to use exact terminology; it is enough that the facts set up show dispossession under the conditions required for forcible entry. Thus, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction.
2. On the sufficiency of the proof: The Supreme Court held that Abad failed to prove prior physical possession. The indispensable requisites for forcible entry are: (a) plaintiff had prior physical possession, and (b) defendant deprived him of it by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Prior physical possession must be proved. The evidence showed the Abads never took physical possession after purchase, having immediately leased it back to Teresita. Their act of leasing was an act of ownership, not proof of prior physical possession. In contrast, respondents proved prior actual possession through rental receipts dating back to 2001 (before the alleged forcible entry in 2002) and a barangay certification stating Oscar’s residence since 1967. Abad offered no concrete evidence to rebut this. Therefore, while jurisdiction was properly invoked, Abad failed to substantiate his claim of prior physical possession, which is a material element of forcible entry.
The Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed, and the complaint for forcible entry was dismissed for lack of merit.