G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056; April 12, 2011
Case Parties/Title: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents. (G.R. No. 176951) / LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents. (G.R. No. 177499) / LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and Management, Respondents. (G.R. No. 178056)

FACTS

This case involves consolidated petitions concerning the constitutionality of sixteen Cityhood Laws (Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491). The petitioners, the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) and others, sought to declare these laws unconstitutional. The procedural history is complex. The Court initially promulgated a Decision on November 18, 2008, and a Resolution on March 31, 2009, which were unfavorable to the respondent municipalities. The respondents filed motions for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, by a 6-6 vote, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the March 31, 2009 Resolution and denied the Second Motion for Reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited pleading, ordering entry of judgment. The respondents then filed a “Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009,” arguing that a tie-vote on a constitutional issue was not binding. The Court, in a Resolution dated June 2, 2009, clarified that by voting on the second motion for reconsideration, it had effectively allowed its filing, making it no longer a prohibited pleading, but it was denied due to lack of votes to overturn the earlier rulings. The Court later expunged certain pleadings. The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution. Subsequently, on December 21, 2009, the Court, voting anew to reach a majority, promulgated a Decision granting the respondents’ motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws constitutional. Later, on February 15, 2011, the Court promulgated a Resolution that granted the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, reversed the August 24, 2010 Resolution, and definitively declared the sixteen Cityhood Laws constitutional. The petitioners filed an “Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration” against the February 15, 2011 Resolution.

ISSUE

The primary issues raised in the petitioners’ Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration are:
1. Whether the Supreme Court had lost jurisdiction to promulgate the February 15, 2011 Resolution because its judgment had long become final and executory.
2. Whether the February 15, 2011 Resolution contravened the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant Supreme Court issuances.
3. Whether the February 15, 2011 Resolution undermined judicial principles like res judicata and the immutability of final judgments.
4. Whether the sixteen Cityhood Laws violate Article X, Sections 6 and 10 of the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether the sixteen Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause and the right of local governments to a just share in national taxes.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
1. On Procedural Issues (Jurisdiction, Finality, Res Judicata): The Court held it retained jurisdiction. The April 28, 2009 Resolution, resulting in a 6-6 tie on the motion for reconsideration, did not constitute a final ruling on the merits that attained immutability. The Court’s subsequent clarifications and actions, including the June 2, 2009 Resolution and the December 21, 2009 Decision, demonstrated that the proceedings were still ongoing to resolve the constitutional issue definitively. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009, was therefore premature. The principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments were not violated because no final and executory judgment on the merits, rendered with the required majority vote, had been reached prior to the Court’s deliberate reconsideration process.
2. On the Constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws: The Court affirmed its ruling in the February 15, 2011 Resolution that the Cityhood Laws are constitutional. It held that these laws, enacted in 2007, were governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) in force at the time of their passage, not by the amended criteria (RA 9009) which took effect in 2001. The Court found that the respondents had complied with the requirements under the 1991 LGC. The exemption of the sixteen municipalities from the higher income requirement imposed by RA 9009 was a legitimate congressional classification, not a violation of the constitutional provisions on the creation of local government units or the Equal Protection Clause. The Court also rejected the claim that the laws violated the local governments’ right to a just share in national taxes.
3. On the Charge of “Flip-Flopping”: The Court, through a separate opinion by Justice Abad included in the text, addressed and rejected the charge that the Justices engaged in improper “flip-flopping.” It explained that the changes in votes were minimal, involved only three Justices over the lengthy proceedings, and were a legitimate exercise of judicial reconsideration, not a wholesale or capricious reversal. The shifts reflected the closely balanced arguments and changes in Court membership, not an undermining of judicial stability.