G.R. No. 176394, 177033, 177304, 177470, 177471 October 21, 2015
COL. ORLANDO E. DE LEON, PN (M), Petitioner vs. LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., (AFP), and SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents; COL. ARMANDO V. BAÑEZ, PN (M), Petitioner-Intervenor; LTC ACHILLES S. SEGUMALIAN, PN (M), Petitioner-Intervenor; MAJOR LEOMAR JOSE M. DOCTOLERO O-10124 (INFANTRY) PHILIPPINE ARMY and CAPTAIN WILLIAM VICTORINO F. UPANO O-11876 (INFANTRY) PHILIPPINE ARMY, Petitioners vs. LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Chief of Staff, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and the SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents; MAJOR JASON L. AQUINO (INF) PA, Petitioner vs. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and appointing and reviewing authority of the Special General Court Martial Nr. 2, and THE SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NR. 2, Respondents; 1ST LIEUTENANT ERVIN C. DIVINAGRACIA O-12742 (INF), PHILIPPINE ARMY, Petitioner vs. LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Chief of Staff, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and the SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents; CAPTAIN JOEY T FONTIVEROS O-11713 (INFANTRY) PHILIPPINE ARMY, Petitioner vs. LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Chief of Staff, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and the SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents

FACTS

Petitioners were among the military officers who participated in a stand-off on February 26, 2006, inside the Philippine Marine Corps headquarters in Fort Bonifacio, stemming from a reported plan to join a protest march calling for the resignation of then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. An Ad Hoc Investigating Committee (AHIC) recommended charging them before a General Court Martial for violations of the Articles of War. A Pre-Trial Investigation Panel (Panel) was constituted, which, after investigation, submitted a Pre-Trial Investigation Report (PTI Report) recommending that some petitioners be tried only for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (Article 96) and not for Attempting to Create or Begin a Mutiny (Article 67), due to an absence of overt acts proximately tending to create collective insubordination. The Staff Judge Advocate for the Chief of Staff, Col. Pedro G. Herrera-Davila, in a Pre-Trial Advice, disapproved the PTI Report and recommended referral to trial by a General Court Martial for violations of Articles 67 and 96 (and Article 97 for one petitioner), finding a prima facie case. Subsequently, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the Chief of Staff, issued a Memorandum dated November 17, 2006, creating and convening a Special General Court Martial to try the cases, and Letter Order No. 758 dated November 24, 2006, designated the officers for the court martial. Petitioners filed consolidated petitions seeking to annul these orders, prohibit further court martial proceedings, and secure their release from detention, alleging violations of due process and the Articles of War, including that a “Special General Court Martial” is not authorized, that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. improperly combined the roles of accuser, appointing authority, and reviewer, and that their confinement was illegal.

ISSUE

Whether the creation of the Special General Court Martial No. 2 and the proceedings against the petitioners violate their right to due process and the provisions of the Articles of War.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions. It held that the creation of the Special General Court Martial No. 2 did not violate the Articles of War or due process. The Court found that the designation “Special General Court Martial” is not a distinct type of court martial but merely a general court martial convened for a special purpose, which is allowed under the Articles of War and relevant manuals. The Court ruled that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr., as the appointing authority, had the power to determine the cases to be referred for trial and to convene the court martial. His actions did not constitute an improper combination of roles as accuser, prosecutor, and judge, as he was not the accuser who swore to the charges, nor was he a member of the prosecuting panel or the court martial itself. The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel’s report was merely recommendatory, and the appointing authority had the discretion to disagree with its findings based on the evidence. The charges were based on a prima facie case established by the evidence reviewed. Furthermore, the petitioners’ confinement was deemed legal as they were charged with serious offenses under the Articles of War. The Court emphasized that military law is a separate system, and judicial intervention is warranted only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which was not present in this case.