G.R. No. 175846; July 6, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROSILA ROCHE, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Rosila Roche applied for original registration of title over a 15,353-square-meter parcel of land in Taguig, Metro Manila. She claimed ownership through inheritance from her father, alleging open, continuous, and exclusive possession since her birth in 1938, with cultivation and payment of realty taxes. She presented a survey plan, technical description, tax declarations, and testimonial evidence from a witness to support her claim of possession since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the application, arguing failure to prove the requisite period of possession and that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) specifically opposed, contending the lot is below the reglementary lake elevation and thus part of the Laguna Lake bed.
The Regional Trial Court granted Roche’s application, ruling she and her predecessor had possessed the land for over 30 years, effectively segregating it from public land. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Republic elevated the case, arguing Roche failed to prove the land is alienable and disposable.

ISSUE

Whether Roche successfully proved that the subject land is alienable or disposable land of the public domain, a requisite for original registration of title.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and denied the application for registration. The Court emphasized that under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an applicant must prove: (1) the land is alienable and disposable public land; (2) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (3) such possession commenced on or before June 12, 1945. Crucially, the Regalian doctrine presumes all lands belong to the State unless proven otherwise. The burden is on the applicant to present incontrovertible evidence that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable.
The Court held that Roche failed to discharge this burden. She did not submit the required certification from the DENR Secretary or a duly authorized representative, such as a CENRO or PENRO certification, attesting that the land was officially classified as alienable and disposable and falling within the approved area. The survey plan and technical description she presented contained no information on land classification. Consequently, she did not overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain. The opposition by the LLDA, while not dispositive, highlighted the land’s questionable status. Since Roche failed to establish the first and fundamental requisite of alienability, her application must be denied without prejudice to a future application supported by the proper evidence.