G.R. No. 175291; July 27, 2011
THE HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS, NAMELY: LOLITA ZABATE CABIGAS, ANECITA C. CANQUE, DIOSCORO CABIGAS, FIDEL CABIGAS, and RUFINO CABIGAS, Petitioners, vs. MELBA L. LIMBACO, LINDA L. LOGARTA, RAMON C. LOGARTA, HENRY D. SEE, FREDDIE S. GO, BENEDICT Y. QUE, AWG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETROSA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and UNIVERSITY OF CEBU BANILAD, INC., Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas, filed a complaint for annulment of titles over various parcels of land registered in the names of the respondents. They alleged that Lolita Cabigas and her late husband Nicolas purchased two lots (Lot Nos. 742 and 953) from Salvador Cobarde on January 15, 1980. Cobarde had purchased these lots from Ines Ouano on February 5, 1948. However, the lots remained registered in Ouano’s name, and she subsequently sold the same lots to the National Airports Corporation on November 25, 1952, which registered the titles in its name. When the airport expansion project did not proceed, respondents Melba Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta (heirs of Ouano) successfully reclaimed title to the lots through a court action for reconveyance. They then subdivided and sold the lots to the other respondents, who registered the titles in their names. Respondents AWG, Petrosa, and UCB filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted on August 23, 2005, dismissing the petitioners’ complaint. The RTC ruled that the National Airports Corporation was a buyer in good faith and its registration of the titles transferred ownership, cutting off the prior unregistered sale to Cobarde and, consequently, the petitioners’ claim. Petitioners filed a notice of ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the appeal in its May 31, 2006 resolution, holding that the appeal raised only questions of law and should have been filed via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court. The CA initially remanded the case regarding other respondents but later, in its October 4, 2006 resolution, set aside the remand order, noting it had no jurisdiction to issue it and that the RTC had dismissed the case in its entirety.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing the petitioners’ ordinary appeal on the ground that it raised only questions of law, making a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court the proper remedy.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the assailed CA resolutions. The Court held that the petitioners availed of the wrong mode of appeal. Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal raising only questions of law must be brought to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. An ordinary appeal to the CA is proper only when the appeal involves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. A question of law exists when the issue concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence to admitted or undisputed facts. The Court discerned from the petitioners’ submissions that the issues they raised pertained to the application of law—specifically, the good faith of the National Airports Corporation, the heirs of Ouano, and the subsequent buyers—given the admitted facts surrounding the registered and unregistered sales. Since the appeal involved only questions of law, the CA correctly dismissed the ordinary appeal for being an improper recourse. The paramount considerations of substantial justice and equity did not justify a reversal, as the rules on the mode of appeal are jurisdictional.