GR 174763; (April, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 174763; April 24, 2007
ANTONIO A. DIMAYUGA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARIO V. MAGSAYSAY, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Antonio Dimayuga and private respondent Mario Magsaysay were candidates for Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas in the May 2004 elections, with Magsaysay initially proclaimed the winner. Dimayuga filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, after revision, declared Dimayuga the winner by 41 votes and granted his Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Magsaysay filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC (Second Division) assailing the RTC’s Special Order granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC Second Division initially issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) but later, in a Resolution dated July 4, 2006, denied Magsaysay’s petition and affirmed the RTC’s Special Order, allowing the writ of execution to be implemented.
Magsaysay filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. Pending this motion, Dimayuga forcibly assumed the office of Mayor. Subsequently, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order dated October 10, 2006, directing the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the RTC’s Special Order (i.e., Magsaysay to remain as Mayor), pending resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration. Dimayuga filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, arguing the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the status quo ante order.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the status quo ante order of October 10, 2006, pending resolution of Magsaysay’s Motion for Reconsideration.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is twofold. First, under Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a timely and non-pro forma Motion for Reconsideration of a Division resolution suspends the execution or implementation of that resolution. Magsaysay’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Second Division’s July 4, 2006 Resolution was timely filed and was not pro forma. Consequently, the implementation of the Second Division’s Resolution (which affirmed the execution pending appeal) was automatically suspended by operation of the COMELEC’s own rules. The status quo ante order was a proper procedural measure to preserve the situation during this suspension and prevent disorder, given the forcible assumption of office by Dimayuga.
Second, the Court’s power of review over COMELEC decisions, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in relation to the Constitution, is generally limited to final orders, rulings, and decisions of the COMELEC en banc. The assailed status quo ante order was an interlocutory order issued incidental to the pending Motion for Reconsideration. It was not a final disposition of the case on the merits. Therefore, it was not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64. The Court, however, ordered the COMELEC to resolve the pending case with utmost dispatch.