GR 174674; (October, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 174674; October 20, 2010
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NESTLE WATERS PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly HIDDEN SPRINGS & PERRIER, INC.), Petitioners, vs. UNIWIDE SALES, INC., UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., NAIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CLUB, INC., FIRST PARAGON CORPORATION, and UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC., Respondents.
FACTS
Respondents, the Uniwide Group of Companies, filed a petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1999. The SEC approved an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP) in 2001 and a Second Amended Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in December 2002. Petitioners, as unsecured creditors, appealed the approval of the SARP, contending its terms were unreasonable and prejudicial. The SEC denied their appeal. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied petitioners’ petition for review, upholding the SEC’s findings. Petitioners then filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, informing it of a supervening event: the decision to transfer respondents’ supermarket operations to Suy Sing Commercial Corporation by March 2006. The CA denied the motion and referred the supplemental motion to the SEC. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should revoke the SARP and terminate the rehabilitation proceedings.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being premature. The Court took judicial notice of significant supervening events that had substantially altered the factual landscape of the rehabilitation case after the petition was filed. The SEC itself had found that several unforeseen factors, including the closure of key Uniwide stores and lack of supplier support, had prevented the SARP’s implementation. Consequently, the rehabilitation receiver had filed a Third Amended Rehabilitation Plan (TARP) and later a Revised TARP. Crucially, the Court noted that two separate cases were already pending before the SEC En Banc (SEC En Banc Case Nos. 12-09-183 and 01-10-193) which directly sought to resolve the very issue of whether the rehabilitation proceedings should be terminated. The Court emphasized the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, holding that the SEC, as the specialized administrative agency, possessed the technical expertise to evaluate the feasibility of amended rehabilitation plans and the propriety of termination. It was not for the Supreme Court to intrude into this domain while the matter was still pending resolution before the SEC. Therefore, pending a final decision from the SEC on those cases, the instant petition was dismissed.