G.R. No. 1746: September 21, 1905
TOMAS OSMEÑA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE GORORDO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Plaintiff Tomas Osmeña filed an action to recover the value of sugar sold to defendant Jose Gorordo under a contract dated August 27, 1894, stipulating payment in four installments from September to December 1894. The complaint was filed on December 26, 1901. The case was first tried before Judge Carlock, who dismissed it on February 11, 1903, holding the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The parties agreed that the losing party could file a bill of exceptions up to the first month of the next court term. Judge Carlock died on April 20, 1903, without signing the bill of exceptions. On July 31, 1903, the plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment and for a new trial, which the successor judge granted. After a new trial, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, contending the court erred in setting aside the original judgment and that the plaintiff’s action was barred by prescription.

ISSUE
(1) Whether the court erred in setting aside the original judgment and granting a new trial. (2) Whether the plaintiff’s action to enforce the obligation under the 1894 contract was barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING
(1) The Supreme Court held that while the successor judge erred in setting aside the original judgment solely because Judge Carlock died without signing the bill of exceptions (as the successor judge had the duty to approve it if certifiable), this error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights. The original judgment was not yet final when set aside, as the time for appeal had not expired. The issue in the appeal would have been the same (prescription), and no vested right was impaired. Under Section 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment is not reversed for non-prejudicial error. (2) The action was not barred. The defendant invoked Article 1966 of the Civil Code, which prescribes in five years actions for payments to be made annually or in shorter periods. The Court ruled that paragraph 3 of Article 1966 applies only to obligations which by their nature (like support pensions or rents) are to be fulfilled periodically within a year or less. The obligation here, arising from a single contract of sale payable in installments, does not pertain to that class. Therefore, the five-year prescriptive period under Article 1966 did not apply. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.