G.R. No. 174113 , January 13, 2016.
Paz Cheng y Chu Vs. People of the Philippines.

FACTS

Petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu was charged with three counts of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The Informations alleged that on various dates in 1997, in Quezon City, she received pieces of jewelry in trust from private complainant Rowena Rodriguez for the purpose of selling them on a commission basis, under the obligation to turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items. She allegedly misappropriated or converted the jewelry or its value to her own use, to the damage and prejudice of Rodriguez. The Regional Trial Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt on all three counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modifications to the penalties imposed. In her appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the lower courts erred in giving weight to the prosecution’s evidence and in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE

Whether the State established beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the accused for the crimes of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bersamin voted to acquit the petitioner. He held that the State did not establish her guilt for estafa through misappropriation beyond reasonable doubt. The essential elements of estafa under Article 315, 1(b) are: (a) personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) there is conversion or diversion of such property or a denial of its receipt; and (c) such act is to the prejudice of another. The dissent focused on the first element, arguing that the obligation to deliver or return the property must be proved. The dissent reasoned that based on the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of the private complainant and the written agreements, the transactions were in the nature of a contract of sale, not an agency to sell on commission. The private complainant’s testimony indicated she “sold” the jewelry to the accused and that the accused would “pay” for them. The written agreements stated the accused “received and bought” the items and promised to pay the stated amounts. Therefore, ownership of the jewelry was transferred to the accused upon delivery, creating a debtor-creditor relationship. Since the petitioner became the owner, she had no obligation to return the same specific property, and her failure to pay the price constituted a civil breach, not criminal misappropriation. Consequently, the Prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the crime—the duty to deliver or return the specific property received. The dissent concluded that with less than all the elements established beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner was entitled to an acquittal.