G.R. No. 173942; June 25, 2008
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. and FAIRWAYS AND BLUE-WATERS RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, and SULLIAN SY NAVAL, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Sullian Sy Naval filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land against petitioners. After petitioners’ counsel failed to attend the pre-trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Naval. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an order dated July 26, 2000. Petitioners received the denial order on August 11, 2000, and filed a Notice of Appeal on August 11, 2000. However, the appellate docket fees were paid only on August 25, 2000. The RTC denied the appeal for being filed out of time, a ruling sustained by the Court of Appeals. This Court initially denied petitioners’ petition, rejecting their argument that the rule on mandatory dismissal for non-payment of fees only became effective on May 1, 2000.

ISSUE

Whether the “fresh period” rule established in Neypes v. Court of Appeals (which grants a new 15-day period to appeal from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration) applies retroactively to this case where the period to appeal lapsed prior to Neypes‘ promulgation on September 14, 2005.

RULING

Yes, the Neypes rule applies retroactively. The Court granted the motion for reconsideration. The legal logic is anchored on the fundamental principle that procedural laws, which do not create or remove vested rights but merely operate in furtherance of a remedy, may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The “fresh period” rule is procedural, as it merely prescribes a new period for taking an appeal. The Court, guided by its prior ruling in Sps. De los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat, explicitly held that the Neypes doctrine bears retroactive application. Since the incidents in this case (August 2000) are contemporaneous with those in De los Santos, there is no rational basis to deny its application here. To do otherwise would create an incongruous situation where parties in earlier cases benefit from the rule while those in later cases do not. Consequently, petitioners’ appeal, with fees paid on August 25, 2000, was perfected within the fresh 15-day period from their receipt of the denial order on August 11, 2000. The assailed rulings were set aside, and the Court of Appeals was directed to give due course to the appeal.