GR 172799; (July, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 172799; July 6, 2007
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, AND/OR RAFAEL BESA, Petitioners, vs. JOHNSON OFFICE & SALES UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW), MA. JESUSA BONSOL and RIZALINDA HIRONDO, Respondents.
FACTS
Respondents Ma. Jesusa Bonsol and Rizalinda Hirondo were dismissed by petitioners Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceutica. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter initially dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in its Resolution dated December 14, 2001, that the dismissals were illegal. The NLRC found that the employees’ violations of company procedure did not constitute serious misconduct warranting termination. The dispositive portion of the Resolution ordered that respondents were entitled to reinstatement to their former positions without backwages, or, in the alternative, to payment of separation pay. The Resolution became final and executory as neither party appealed.
Subsequently, petitioners manifested their willingness to pay the monetary award for separation pay. Respondents, however, refused the payment and instead filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce their reinstatement. Petitioners opposed, arguing that the final NLRC Resolution granted them the option to choose between reinstatement and separation pay, and that reinstatement was no longer feasible due to strained relations.
ISSUE
Whether the final and executory NLRC Resolution dated December 14, 2001, granted the employer-petitioners the exclusive option to choose between reinstating the employees or paying them separation pay.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the option to choose between reinstatement and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement belongs to the illegally dismissed employee, not the employer. This is a settled doctrine. The NLRC’s finding that respondents were “not entirely faultless” pertained only to the forfeiture of backwages, a consequence distinct from the right to reinstatement. It did not alter the fundamental rule that an employee found to have been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. The employer cannot unilaterally substitute this right with separation pay based on a claim of strained relations, especially when such a claim was not substantiated with sufficient evidence. The final NLRC Resolution, when read in its entirety, did not grant the petitioners an exclusive option. Its directive was consistent with established jurisprudence: reinstatement is the primary relief, and the alternative of separation pay is for the benefit of the employee, typically available when reinstatement is no longer viable. The petitioners’ interpretation was erroneous. The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the NLRC’s subsequent resolutions ordering reinstatement.