GR 172796; (July, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 172796; July 13, 2009
SPS. ARTEMIO and ESPERANZA ADUAN, Petitioners, vs. LEVI CHONG, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Levi Chong and his wife Nelia obtained a loan from petitioners, secured by a postdated check and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a Tondo property. When the check was dishonored, petitioners filed criminal complaints for B.P. 22 and Estafa and initiated foreclosure. The Chongs, in turn, filed a forgery complaint, alleging petitioner Esperanza Aduan induced her uncle, Ernesto Sagum, to forge Levi Chong’s signature on the mortgage deed. The Manila City Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an Information for falsification against both Sagum and Esperanza.
Esperanza sought review by the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ modified the resolution, ordering her discharge from the Information. It relied on Sagum’s admission that he alone forged the signature without Esperanza’s assistance, finding no clear evidence of conspiracy. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) subsequently dropped Esperanza from the case. Respondent Chong challenged the DOJ resolutions before the Court of Appeals, which reversed the DOJ. The appellate court reinstated the Information, holding that Esperanza, as the mortgagee beneficiary, likely conspired with Sagum, and that the DOJ’s decision lacked basis.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the DOJ’s finding of no probable cause to indict Esperanza Aduan for falsification of public document.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the DOJ resolutions. The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function vested in the prosecutor, subject to judicial review only for grave abuse of discretion. The DOJ correctly found no probable cause against Esperanza.
The legal logic centers on the insufficiency of evidence to establish conspiracy. Sagum’s categorical admission, being against his own penal interest, carried weight and directly exculpated Esperanza by stating she did not participate in or have knowledge of the forgery. Mere benefit from a forged document does not, by itself, constitute evidence of conspiracy. The Court found the appellate court’s reasoning—that Esperanza must have conspired because she benefited as mortgagee—to be speculative and absurd, as it would unjustly implicate any beneficiary. Without affirmative evidence showing a common criminal design or overt acts by Esperanza to facilitate the forgery, the finding of probable cause against her fails. The DOJ’s conclusion was thus within its discretion and not attended by grave abuse.