G.R. No. 172553; December 14, 2011
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, HON. VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ, and THE GENERAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU-A, Represented by MARIA OLIVIA ELENA A. ROXAS, Petitioners, vs. JESUS D. FRANCISCO, SR., Respondent.

FACTS

In November 1998, Ligorio Naval filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-1-98-2365) against Mayor Jessie Castillo of Bacoor, Cavite, and others for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the award of the construction of the municipal building to St. Martha’s Trading and General Contractors. Naval alleged the contractor was unqualified due to an expired license and a classification (“Category C”) limiting it to projects worth ₱3 million or less. On April 29, 1999, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, finding that Castillo had satisfactorily controverted the allegations with certifications showing the contractor had a valid license and was classified under “Category A.” Naval’s motion for reconsideration was denied on August 27, 1999.
Subsequently, Naval made allegations to Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. that his evidence was not considered and the complaint was dismissed in exchange for money. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto ordered a reevaluation. On May 30, 2000, a Graft Investigation Officer recommended reviving and re-docketing the case for further preliminary investigation with additional respondents. This was approved on September 30, 2000. The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Ombudsman then executed a complaint-affidavit for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service against five municipal officers, including respondent Jesus D. Francisco, Sr. (then Municipal Planning and Development Officer and a member of the Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of Bacoor, Cavite). This was docketed as Administrative Case No. OMB-C-A-05-0032-A.
On May 30, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued an Order preventively suspending Francisco and the other PBAC members. Francisco received the Order on July 1, 2005. On July 22, 2005, he filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering his preventive suspension because the transaction had already been adjudicated in the earlier dismissed case (OMB-1-98-2365), barring the new administrative case under the principle of res judicata. He also contended that preventive suspension was not justified as he was not charged with dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, and his stay in office would not prejudice the case.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order against respondent Jesus D. Francisco, Sr., on the ground of res judicata.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The principle of res judicata does not apply to bar the administrative case (OMB-C-A-05-0032-A) against Francisco. The elements of res judicata are: (a) a final judgment; (b) rendered by a court with jurisdiction; (c) on the merits; and (d) identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the two cases. While the dismissal order in the earlier criminal complaint (OMB-1-98-2365) was a final judgment on the merits by a competent body, there is no identity of parties. The respondents in the first case were Mayor Jessie Castillo and others, while the administrative case was against different individuals—the PBAC members, including Francisco, who were not parties to the first case. Furthermore, there is no identity of causes of action. The first case was a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, while the second is an administrative case for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. An administrative case is separate and distinct from a criminal action. The dismissal of the criminal complaint does not preclude the institution of an administrative proceeding based on the same acts, as the evidence required and the objectives differ. Therefore, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order. The Supreme Court reinstated the Ombudsman’s Order of preventive suspension.