G.R. No. 172196; October 19, 2011
ADELAIDA MENESES (deceased), substituted by her heir MARILYN M. CARBONEL-GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO, Respondent.

FACTS

On June 8, 1988, respondent Rosario G. Venturozo filed a Complaint for ownership, possession, and damages against petitioner Adelaida Meneses in the RTC of Dagupan City. Respondent claimed to be the absolute owner of an untitled coconut land in Mangaldan, Pangasinan, which she purchased from the spouses Basilio de Guzman and Crescencia Abad on January 31, 1973, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. The vendors, in turn, allegedly purchased the same property from petitioner Adelaida Meneses on June 20, 1966, as shown by another Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent alleged she was in possession until May 1983 when petitioner, with armed men, grabbed possession and refused to vacate.
In her Answer, petitioner Adelaida Meneses denied selling the property. She alleged that the 1966 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Basilio de Guzman (respondent’s father) was a forgery, as she never signed it, appeared before a notary public, or obtained a residence certificate for it. Consequently, she argued the subsequent 1973 sale to respondent was also null and void. Petitioner claimed she inherited the land from her father and had been in possession for over 30 years as owner. She also stated this was the fourth case filed against her concerning the same land.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, declaring both the 1966 and 1973 Deeds of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio, declaring petitioner as the owner, and ordering respondent to execute a deed of reconveyance and pay damages. The trial court found petitioner’s signature on the 1966 deed to be a forgery, noting variances from her specimen signatures, and emphasized her continued possession of the land.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It held that petitioner failed to prove forgery by clear and convincing evidence. It noted petitioner’s admission during direct examination, where she identified the signature on the 1966 deed as her own. The appellate court gave weight to the notarized document’s presumption of regularity and the testimony of the notary public, Atty. Abelardo G. Biala, who confirmed its due execution. It declared respondent the owner and ordered petitioner to vacate and surrender possession.

ISSUE

Whether the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, is in keeping with both law and jurisprudence. (The core substantive issue is the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, and consequently, the ownership of the disputed land.)

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the Decision of the Court of Appeals and REINSTATED the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner failed to prove the forgery of the 1966 Deed of Sale. The Court found that petitioner’s isolated statement during testimony—identifying a signature as hers—was taken out of context. A review of the entire testimony revealed she consistently denied knowing the document, executing the deed, or appearing before the notary public. Her statement was a simple identification of a signature presented to her, not a judicial admission of the deed’s authenticity.
The Court emphasized that forgery must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies with the party alleging forgery. In this case, petitioner successfully discharged this burden. The RTC’s finding of forgery was based on a comparison of the contested signature with her undisputed specimen signatures from other documents, which showed marked variances. The testimony of the notary public, Atty. Biala, was found not credible as he could not recall specific details of the execution and failed to record the deed in his notarial register, contrary to law. His claim that the deed was a private document he notarized as a favor was highly irregular.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the 1966 deed was void for lack of a valid notarization. Notarization converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible without further proof of its authenticity. For a deed of sale of real property, the law requires the vendor’s residence certificate to be stated. The 1966 deed lacked this requisite detail. More critically, the notary public’s failure to record it in his notarial register was a violation of the Notarial Law, rendering the notarization fatally defective. Consequently, the deed remained a private document, and its due execution and authenticity were successfully challenged by petitioner.
Since the 1966 sale from petitioner to Basilio de Guzman was invalid, the subsequent 1973 sale from de Guzman to respondent conveyed no rights. Petitioner, who remained in continuous possession of the land, was rightfully declared its owner by the RTC. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, which were supported by the evidence on record.