G.R. No. 172035; July 4, 2012
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Fernando Q. Miguel, former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Falsification of Public Document. The information alleged that in 1995, he conspired with private individuals to give them unwarranted benefits by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants for a public market project without the required publication in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants. The Ombudsman found probable cause, and the information was filed in 2000. After a reinvestigation process where the petitioner failed to submit his counter-affidavit despite several extensions, he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in 2004.
In 2005, the prosecution moved for the petitioner’s suspension pendente lite. The petitioner opposed, arguing the information was fatally defective for failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits was done through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence” specifically attributable to him. He also contended that no pre-suspension hearing was conducted. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered a 90-day suspension in January 2006, denying his motion for reconsideration in March 2006. The petitioner then filed this certiorari petition, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioner’s suspension pendente lite despite the alleged defects in the information and the absence of a formal pre-suspension hearing.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions. On the sufficiency of the information, the Court ruled it validly charged an offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The information explicitly stated the petitioner, acting with “evident bad faith and manifest partiality,” conspired to give unwarranted benefits. The qualifying phrases directly modified the petitioner’s actions as the principal accused public officer. An information is sufficient if it states the acts constituting the offense in terms enabling a person of common understanding to know what is charged. The information met this standard, and any perceived ambiguity was a matter of defense for trial, not a ground to nullify it or the suspension order.
Regarding the pre-suspension hearing, the Court held the requirement was substantially complied with. A pre-suspension hearing is not a trial on the merits but merely a determination of the validity of the information. The petitioner was given a full opportunity to contest the suspension through his “Vigorous Opposition,” where he thoroughly argued the alleged defect in the information. The Sandiganbayan duly considered these arguments before ruling. The essence of the hearing is to hear the accused’s side on the validity of the information, which was satisfied. The suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory upon a finding of a valid information, serving the purpose of preventing the accused from using his office to influence the proceedings or frustrate the prosecution. No grave abuse of discretion was found in the Sandiganbayan’s issuance of the suspension order.