G.R. No. 171911 ; January 26, 2010
BERNARDA CH. OSMEÑA, Petitioner, vs. NICASIO CH. OSMEÑA, JOSE CH. OSMEÑA, TOMAS CH. OSMEÑA, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO CH. OSMEÑA AND SIXTA CH. OSMEÑA, Respondents.

FACTS

The parties are descendants of spouses Quintin Chiong Osmeña and Chiong Tan Sy. Petitioner Bernarda is the daughter, while respondents are grandchildren (sons of Ignacio, Bernarda’s brother). The dispute involves two parcels of land (Lots 43 and 54) and an ancestral house on Lot 4. The ancestral house was mentioned in the last will and testament of Chiong Tan Sy, but the two lots were not. The titles to the lots were in the name of respondents’ father, Ignacio, and upon his death, respondents transferred title to their own names. Petitioner asserts co-ownership of the three properties. She claims the two lots were her mother’s properties, part of the inheritance, and were only placed in Ignacio’s name because their mother, a Chinese national, was legally prohibited from owning land. Regarding the house, she claims her share was transferred to Ignacio under a simulated contract to defeat claims by her estranged husband, and her continued residence without paying rent proves her co-ownership. Respondents base their claim on the transfer certificates of title for the lots and a deed of sale dated April 26, 1982, signed by petitioner, covering her share in the ancestral house. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized the validity of these documents. The trial court enjoined petitioner from using the land for her orchid business and ordered her to leave the house. The CA modified the decision, declaring petitioner a co-owner of the ancestral house only to the extent of shares she inherited from two other siblings.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the deed of sale dated April 26, 1982 and in holding that respondents are the owners of the disputed lots.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court is not bound to re-weigh evidence, especially when the findings of the trial court and the appellate court coincide. The deed of sale dated April 26, 1982 is a legal and binding document, supported by witness testimonies and is a notarized document constituting prima facie evidence of the facts therein. In the absence of evidence proving petitioner’s claim of a fictitious sale, there is no basis to set it aside. The Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to errors of law, and the factual findings of the lower courts are deemed conclusive. Assuming arguendo that the lots were indeed properties of Chiong Tan Sy placed in Ignacio’s name due to constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership, the Court will not consent to any violation of that prohibition. Furthermore, by signing the deed of sale, petitioner would have been a party to the alleged simulated document. The Court, applying the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, stated that no affirmative relief is available where the claimed right stems from alleged illegal acts. The Court leaves the parties where they have placed themselves.