G.R. No. 171678, December 10, 2008
ROSA J. SALES, EARL RYAN CHENG and EMIL RALPH CHENG, petitioners, vs. WILLIAM BARRO, respondent.

FACTS

This case originated from an ejectment complaint filed by petitioners Rosa J. Sales, Earl Ryan Cheng, and Emil Ralph Cheng against respondent William Barro, his wife, and all persons claiming rights under them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28. Petitioners alleged they are the owners of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 262237; that respondent constructed a shanty on the lot without their consent; that respondent and his co-defendants had not been paying rent; and that they refused to vacate despite formal demand, with a Barangay Certification to File Action issued. In his answer, respondent essentially claimed his construction of a temporary makeshift house was tolerated by petitioners as he acted as the caretaker of the property, and he did not recall receiving any demand letter or summons. The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring the respondents as possessors by tolerance and ordering them to vacate, pay monthly compensation, and pay attorney’s fees. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, finding the complaint substantially lacking in requisite allegations for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this petition.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the ejectment complaint on the ground that it failed to state the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession.
2. Whether the respondent was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition, upholding the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the complaint.
1. On the Nature of the Complaint and Jurisdiction: The Court held the complaint was a fatally defective complaint for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The petitioners’ own averments contradicted a claim for unlawful detainer. They alleged respondent constructed the shanty “without their consent” and prayed for rent from January 2004, which was the inception of respondent’s occupation and also the date petitioners became owners of the property. This indicated petitioners considered respondent’s occupation unlawful from the beginning. For unlawful detainer, the owner’s permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of possession, which was absent here. The nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses in the answer. The complaint was for forcible entry but fatally defective because it lacked the mandatory allegation of the petitioners’ prior physical possession of the lot. Allegation of ownership does not satisfy the requirement of prior physical possession in ejectment cases.
2. On Estoppel: The Court ruled the respondent was not estopped from questioning jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and its lack can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. Estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. Even if respondent did not raise the issue, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling on lack of jurisdiction and may even order dismissal motu proprio.