GR 171579; (November, 2012) (Digest)
G.R. No. 171579; November 14, 2012
LILY SY, Petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, BENITO FERNANDEZ GO, BERTHOLD LIM, JENNIFER SY, GLENN BEN TIAK SY and MERRY SY, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Lily Sy filed a complaint for robbery, alleging that on December 16, 1999, respondents Benito Fernandez Go and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy, with others, forcibly opened the door to her condominium unit, replaced the lock, and later, along with other respondents, took numerous boxes of her personal belongings valued at over P10 million. She claimed the unit was her residence. Respondents, who are her siblings and in-laws, countered that the entire building was owned by their family corporation, that the unit was the former family home, and that they had merely changed the lock and retrieved corporate and personal properties left therein pursuant to a board resolution, all arising from a dispute over their parents’ estate. The Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause for Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and filed an Information. Upon petition for review, the Secretary of Justice reversed, finding no probable cause and directing the withdrawal of the Information, a decision the Court of Appeals later set aside for grave abuse of discretion, reinstating the prosecutor’s finding.
ISSUE
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the finding of probable cause for robbery against the respondents.
RULING
Yes, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the Information. The legal logic is anchored on the limited scope of a Secretary’s review and the substantive elements of the crime. In a petition for review, the Secretary determines only whether the prosecutor committed a grave error of law or acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Secretary overstepped by making a factual determination that the taking was under a claim of ownership, which is a matter of defense best ventilated in a full trial. Probable cause merely requires evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the accused is probably guilty. Petitioner’s allegations—forcible entry, replacement of locks, and taking of personal items without consent—prima facie constitute the elements of robbery through force upon things. The Secretary’s conclusion that the place was not “uninhabited” was irrelevant, as the Information could be amended to allege robbery in an inhabited place, a non-substantial amendment. The Court held that the Secretary substituted her own judgment on evidentiary matters, which was a capricious and whimsical exercise of power amounting to grave abuse of discretion, warranting judicial correction.
